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The idea that we have a moral right to privacy that ought, as a matter
of political morality, to be protected by the coercive authority of the law
is of comparatively recent vintage.1 Prior to the seminal argument
published by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in 1890 that
there is a right to be let alone, there was no widely held belief that
people have a right to privacy—moral or otherwise.2 Although people
did believe that we have moral rights now thought to fall under the
rubric of privacy, such as a right to physical separation in the borders of
a physical home of one’s own, these rights were afforded adequate
protection by other moral and legal rights up to that point. In particular,
my right to property allowed me to exclude you from obtaining information
about me by being in my house or by peering into the windows if my
blinds were drawn.
The publication of Warren and Brandeis’s article triggered an evaluation
of the issue of whether we have a privacy right that is independent of
other moral rights we have, which may help in protecting some of the
same interests, like the right to physical separation. Legal protection
against slander, once thought of as being justified in terms of damage to
one’s property interest in one’s reputation, was also thought to reflect a
morally protected interest in privacy—although truth remained an
absolute defense. New torts were created to protect this new interest
where the truth of what was disclosed is not a defense against liability:
dissemination of certain private facts is considered both morally wrong,
regardless of whether or not they are true, and legally actionable in tort
under certain circumstances.
In the early 1960s, the Supreme Court began to develop a jurisprudence
incorporating pieces of this interest into the Constitution. A series of cases
beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut hold that citizens have a right of
privacy in personal decisions regarding marriage and reproduction.3 The
Court vitiated, first, bans on sales of contraceptives to married couples,
then to unmarried couples, and finally to minors. Later cases established
a constitutional right to abortion and a constitutional right to be free of
coercive state prohibitions against certain sexual acts, such as anal sex
performed by two consenting adult males.

1. Much of my discussion here is informed by the excellent discussion in AMITAI
ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 188–96 (1999).
2. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 195–96, 205 (1890).
3. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down law prohibiting access
of unmarried couples to contraception); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking
down law prohibiting miscegenation); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86
(1965) (striking down prohibition on distribution of contraception to married couples).
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Although some of these constitutional rights are deeply contested and
resented by more conservative segments of the population, most people
seem to believe that we have a moral right to informational privacy—
informational and reproductive privacy are analytically and substantively
distinct—that ought to be protected by the legal system. I think it is fair
to say that the claim that we have such a right is, at this point in time,
utterly uncontroversial among mainstream conservatives and liberals,
even if the content of this right and the nature of the appropriate legal
protection—constitutional or statutory—is contested.
In this essay, I consider the scope of this right to informational privacy
relative to our interests in security and argue, in particular, that the right
to privacy must yield to these interests in the case of a direct conflict.4 I
offer arguments from a number of different perspectives. I will, for
example, begin with a case directly rooted in what I take to be ordinary
case intuitions and then continue with an argument grounded in the
distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value, which is thought to
serve as a rough mark between what is important from a moral point of
view and what is important from other points of view; though there can,
obviously, be means to moral ends that will have moral significance in
virtue of their relations to these ends. However, I will largely be concerned
with showing that the major mainstream approaches to justifying state
authority presuppose or imply that security interests can justify infringements
of privacy rights. For example, I will argue that utilitarian and contractarian
justifications of state authority entail that when privacy conflicts with the
most important security interests, those security interests trump the privacy
interests. I conclude that the idea that privacy rights are absolute in the
sense that they are never justifiably infringed, which is surprisingly
common, is not only counterintuitive, but lacks any general theoretical
support from any of the major mainstream theories of legitimacy.
At the outset, I should point out that I do not attempt to resolve the
very difficult questions associated with determining whether privacy
interests genuinely conflict with security interests—and how to resolve
those conflicts. I think, for example, that the general principle purporting to
justify the USA PATRIOT Act is correct, but that it does not justify
many of the provisions of that Act, because those provisions do not
address or resolve any genuine conflict between privacy and security. I
cannot defend the view here, but I doubt that allowing law enforcement
4.

See discussion infra Part IV.
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officers to inspect a patron’s library records does any work by way of
making us safer from the threat of terrorism; terrorists are much too
careful to do their research by checking out books from a public library.
If this is correct, then the provision allowing inspection of library
records is not justified by the general principle allowing infringements
of privacy when necessary to protect important security interests,
because there is no genuine conflict between privacy interests—assuming
we have legitimate privacy interests in what we check out from a public
library—and these more important security interests.
Although an account that enables us to determine when security and
privacy come into conflict and when security trumps privacy would be
of great importance if I am correct about the general principle, my
efforts in this essay will have to be limited to showing that the various
theories of legitimacy presuppose or entail that, other things being equal,
security is, as a general matter, more important than privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the moral rights most people believe deserve legal protection,
none is probably more poorly understood than privacy. What exactly
privacy is, what interests it encompasses, and why it deserves legal
protection, are three of the most contentious issues in theorizing about
information ethics and legal theory. While there is certainly disagreement
about the nature and importance of other moral rights deserving legal
protection, like the right to property, the very concept of privacy is
deeply contested. Some people believe that the various interests commonly
characterized as privacy interests have some essential feature in common
that constitutes them as privacy interests; others believe that there is no
such feature and that the concept of privacy encompasses a variety of
unrelated interests, some of which deserve legal protection while others
do not.
Notably, many people tend to converge on the idea that privacy rights,
whatever they ultimately encompass, are absolute in the sense that they
may not legitimately be infringed for any reason. While the various
iterations of the USA PATRIOT Act are surely flawed with respect to
their particulars, there are many people who simply oppose, on principle,
even a narrowly crafted attempt to combat terrorism that infringes
minimally on privacy interests. There is no valid justification of any kind,
on this absolutist conception, for infringing any of the interests falling
within the scope of the moral right to privacy.
It is perhaps worth noting that absolutist conceptions are not limited to
privacy rights. Some people take the position that the moral right to life
is absolute; on an absolutist conception of the right to life, it is never
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justified to take the life of a person—and this rules out not only the death
penalty, but the use of deadly force in defense of the lives of innocent
others from a culpable attack. Many people take an absolutist view with
respect to something they call a “right to information,” holding that there
should be no restrictions of any kind, including legal protection of
intellectual property rights, on the free flow of information. As this view
has most famously, and idiosyncratically, been put by John Perry Barlow,
“information wants to be free.”5 When it comes to rights, absolutist talk
among theorists, lawyers, and ordinary folk is not at all uncommon these
days.
Indeed, some people seem to think that rights are, by nature, absolute
and hence that it is a conceptual truth that all rights are absolute.
Consider the following quote from Patrick Murphy, a Democrat who ran
for Congress in 2006:
I am also very concerned about the erosion of constitutional rights and civil
liberties over the past few years. I taught Constitutional Law at West Point, and
it makes me so angry to see our elected leaders in Washington—specifically the
White House and the Republican leadership in Congress—pushing policies that
erode the foundation of this country. The equal protection clause of the constitution
is absolute. The right to privacy is absolute. The right to assemble is absolute.
Yet time and time again, the administration has supported, and the Congressional
leadership has supported nominees and policies that do not follow the constitution.
With my background, I can add to this debate. And I’m not afraid to take a
stand for what’s right.6

As Murphy explains it, every right in the Constitution is absolute and
hence utterly without exception. As there is nothing in the Constitution
or any legal instrument or norm that suggests or entails that constitutional
rights are absolute, it is reasonable to think that Murphy believes, as
many people do, that it is part of the very meaning of having a right that
it can never justifiably be infringed. This is why debates about political
issues are frequently framed in terms of whether there is some right that
protects the relevant interests; rights provide the strongest level of moral
or legal protection of the relevant interests.
It is certainly true that rights provide a higher level of protection than
any other considerations that are morally relevant, but it is not because
rights are, by nature, absolute. Rights provide robust protection of the
5. John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84, 89, available
at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas.html.
6. Above Average Jane, http://aboveavgjane.blogspot.com/2005/12/interviewwith-patrick-murphy.html (Dec. 4, 2005, 23:06 EST) (emphasis added).
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relevant interests because it is a conceptual truth that the infringement of
any right cannot be justified by an appeal of the desirable consequences
of doing so. No matter how many people it might make happy, it would
be wrong to intentionally kill an innocent person because her right to life
takes precedence over the interests of other people in their own happiness.
As Ronald Dworkin famously puts this conceptual point, rights trump
consequences.7
But this conceptual truth about rights does not imply rights are, by
nature, absolute. The claim that rights trump consequences implies
only that some stronger consideration than the desirable consequences of
infringing a right can justify doing so. This latter claim leaves open the
possibility that there is some such consideration that would justify
infringing some rights.
One such candidate, of course, is the existence of other more important
rights. It is commonly thought that at least some rights are commensurable
and can be ranked in a hierarchy that expresses the relative weight each
right in the hierarchy has with respect to other rights. For example, one
might think that the right to life is at the top of the hierarchy of
commensurable rights, and that property rights are in this hierarchy also.
This would explain the common intuition that one may use deadly force
when necessary to defend innocent lives from culpable attack, but not
when necessary only to defend property rights from violation. If, as
seems clear from this example, it is possible for two rights to conflict
and for one to outweigh the other, it follows that rights are not, by
nature, absolute.
What may explain the mistaken view that rights are necessarily absolute
is confusion about the relationship of various terms that flesh out the
status, origin, and contours of moral rights and obligations. For example,
rights are frequently described as “inviolable,” meaning that a right can
never be justifiably violated. This, of course, is a conceptual truth; to
say that a right is violated is to say that its infringement is without
justification. But this does not imply that rights can never be justifiably
infringed; a person’s right to life can be justifiably infringed if he
culpably shoots at an innocent person and there is no other way to save
that person’s life except through use of lethal force in defense of his life.
Rights are also thought, by nature, to be supreme, relative to some
system of norms—moral, social, or legal—in the sense that they cannot
be defeated by other kinds of protections; moral rights are thought to be
supreme over all other kinds of considerations, including social and legal
rights. But this does not imply that rights are absolute because it says

7.
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nothing about the relative importance of one right to another; it simply
asserts that, by nature, rights outweigh all other relevant considerations.
Supremacy and inviolability are part of the very nature of a right, but
these properties do not entail that rights are, by nature, absolute.
Of course, the negation of the claim that all rights are absolute does
not imply that no rights are absolute. The possibility of conflicts between
any two rights does not preclude there being one right that wins every
conflict because it is absolute, and hence, without exception. A moral
pacifist, for example, takes this view of the moral right to life and holds
that intentional killing of a human being is always wrong. Moreover, if
there are two rights that do not come into conflict with each other and
win in conflicts with all other rights, those two rights might be absolute.
One might think, for example, that the rights to privacy and life can
never conflict and that both are absolute.
I am somewhat skeptical that any right is absolute in this strong sense,
but if there are any, it will not be privacy. As we will see in more detail,
privacy is commensurable with other rights, like the right to life, which
figures into the right to security. It seems clear that privacy rights and
the right to life can come into conflict. For example, a psychologist
might be justified in protecting a patient’s privacy interests even though
doing so includes information that might prevent that person from
committing a minor property crime of some kind, but she would not be
justified in protecting that information if the psychologist knows its
disclosure is necessary to prevent a murder. In any event, I will discuss
these kinds of examples in more detail below.
II. THE CONCEPT AND MORAL RIGHT OF INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
An account of the concept of privacy differs from a substantive
account of the contours of the moral right to privacy, if any. An account
of the concept of privacy consists in a set of purely descriptive sentences
that describe which interests are covered by the concept—without
making, presupposing, or entailing any substantive claims about whether
these interests are protected by morality or whether these interests
should, as a matter of political morality, be protected by the law. An
account of the moral right of privacy is a normative set of propositions
that describes those interests falling within the concept of privacy that
are protected by a moral right. A normative account may validate all or
only some of the interests covered by the concept.
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There are a number of different views about the nature of privacy and
the scope of what is protected.8 Some authors take a skeptical view,
believing that the interests we characterize as “privacy” interests have
nothing essential in common and are protected, to the extent they are
protected, by different rights.9 Law and economics theorists argue that
these interests ought not to be protected by law because they are
economically inefficient.10 Feminists worry that privacy rights conceal
oppressive practices of men against women, including domestic violence.11
Others hold a positive conception of privacy and believe that moral
interests in privacy are legitimately protected by the law. Many of these
theorists recognize that privacy interests seem to encompass a variety of
different interests, including reproductive freedom, control over the free
flow of information about oneself,12 the ability to exclude people from
certain spaces and facts as a means of enhancing human dignity,13
controlling access to ourselves,14 and maintaining intimacy in personal
relationships.15 The earliest conception of privacy defined it as the right
to be let alone.16 Although it has become clear that different cultures
have different views about whether, why, and to what extent certain
privacy interests are important, the assumption among these writers is
that the cluster of interests we characterize as privacy deserves legal
protection—regardless of whether there is any particular essential
property all and only privacy interests instantiate.
Although I will not say much by way of argument here, I will
conceive of the relevant right as being a moral right to informational
privacy that obligates one to refrain from attempting to procure certain
kinds of information about others, without their consent or some other
legitimate authorization, in which they have a reasonable expectation of
privacy. I exclude what is commonly called reproductive privacy, because I

8. See generally Judith DeCew, Privacy, in STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Edward
N. Zalta ed., Fall 2006 ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/privacy (discussing various
privacy theories). My discussion here owes an obvious debt to this outstanding survey
article.
9. Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295, 308 (1975).
10. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 235, 244–45 (1981).
11. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 193
(1989).
12. W.A. Parent, Privacy, Morality and the Law, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269, 272–
73 (1983).
13. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 973–74, 1002–03 (1964).
14. Adam D. Moore, Privacy: Its Meaning and Value, 40 AM. PHIL. Q. 215, 215
(2003).
15. James Rachels, Why Privacy is Important, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323, 325–330
(1975).
16. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 193.
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follow James Griffin in believing that the interests protected by the socalled right to reproductive privacy are better conceptualized as being
liberty interests.17 I exclude what is commonly expressed by a right to
control access to oneself, because I think this amounts to a need for
personal space and physical separation that has less to do with protecting
informational privacy than with protecting us from feeling physically
vulnerable because intruded upon. I recently attended a concert, for
example, in which my wife and I got fairly close to the stage during the
opening act before the venue began to fill with people there for the
headliners. As the headliners began to play, people started crowding up
against us, causing me, more than my wife, considerable discomfort.
Such discomfort, however, had nothing to do with a sense that those
persons would learn private facts about me; rather, I simply began to feel
claustrophobic and somewhat threatened physically.
There is no question, as Adam Moore points out in his important
contribution to this symposium, that we are beings who need some physical
separation from others, but it does not follow that what motivates this is
a need to protect informational privacy.18 Indeed, as Moore points out,
the need for physical separation seems to be universal among highly
developed mammals—despite the fact that these other mammals lack the
requisite linguistic or quasi-linguistic skills to process information. Because
they cannot process, much less understand, the notion, it is fallacious
to infer a right to informational privacy from a need for physical
separation, even if this need gives rise to a right; after all, the right of
physical separation can be as adequately protected by property rights as
by any other right.
Indeed, this is probably true of some interests that are fairly
characterized as informational privacy interests. A store with a unisex
bathroom that allows men and women to use the bathroom at the same
time clearly threatens informational privacy; people tend to regard
information about what they look like in various states of undress as
private to members of the sex to which they are attracted, and tend to
regard information about what they look like while eliminating waste as
being private relative to just about everyone else—and legitimately so.
But these interests, though properly conceptualized as concerned with
17. See James Griffin, The Human Right to Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 697,
709–10, 717 (2007).
18. Adam D. Moore, Toward Informational Privacy Rights, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
809, 815–18 (2007).
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information privacy, are adequately protected by a system of free
enterprise anchored in private property rights, as these are traditionally
conceived. Such a business would probably not last very long in the
marketplace. Anyone who wants to make a profit selling things will simply
have to recognize certain social conventions having to do with separation,
personal space, and privacy of the person.
For our purposes, it does not matter what view one takes on these
issues. My concern in this essay is to show that, from the standpoint of
mainstream moral and political theorizing about the legitimacy of the
state, informational privacy rights are below security rights in the moral
hierarchy. In other words, I reject any conception of privacy rights that
regards them as absolute from the standpoint of morality—political and
individual. Although I cannot resolve the issue of whether such interests
share a common essence, my thesis that security trumps privacy can be
shown without taking a position on this important issue.
III. THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY AND ASSOCIATED
MORAL INTERESTS
A. Elements of Security
I take the concept of physical security to refer to a variety of interests
a person has in the healthy continuation of her life and the life of her
community. By “healthy,” I mean a continuation of her life and community
that is free of certain kinds of encumbrances characteristic of diseases
and serious injuries in the case of a person’s life and characteristic of
certain kinds of crises in the life of a community.
At the outset, it is important to stress that security interests do not
embrace interests not immediately related to the survival and minimal
physiological well-being of the individual. My interest in security
encompasses my interest in continuing life, my interest in being free
from the kind of physical injury that threatens my ability to provide for
myself, my interest in being free from the kind of financial injury that
puts me in conditions of health- or life-threatening poverty, and my
interest in being free from psychological trauma inflicted by others that
renders me unable to care for myself.
My interest in security is a negative one in the sense that it is protected
by a moral right constituted, in part, by moral obligations owed to me by
other people to refrain from committing acts of violence or theft capable
of causing serious threats to my health, well-being, and life. While it is
difficult to draw the line between a serious harm and a nonserious harm,
it will have to suffice for my purposes to say that a serious harm is one
that interferes significantly with the daily activities that not only give my
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life meaning, but make it possible for me to continue to survive.
Significant trauma to the brain not only interferes with many activities
that constitute what Don Marquis calls the “goodness of life,”19 but
also interferes with my ability to make a living teaching and writing
philosophy—while a mildly bruised arm does not. Where exactly to draw
the line is not entirely clear, but for my purposes I do not think much
turns on it as long as it is understood that security interests do not include
minor injuries of any kind. I imagine the boundaries of the relevant
notion of seriousness are likely to be contested in any event, but all
would agree that the interest in security, by nature, protects only against
threats of serious injuries.
It should be abundantly clear that morality protects these interests in
the strongest terms available to it. Unless one is a complete skeptic
about morality and moral objectivity, little argument is needed to show
that we have a moral right to be free from acts that pose a high risk of
causing either our death or grievous injuries to our bodies. Moreover, I
would hazard that non-skeptics about morality would also accept that the
moral right to physical security is sufficiently important that a state is, as
a matter of political morality, obligated to protect it, by criminalizing
attacks on it, as a condition of its legitimacy. No state authority that
failed to protect this right could be morally legitimate; at the very least
no state authority that failed to do so could be justified in claiming a
legitimate monopoly over the use of force.
Security interests are not, however, just about our own well-being; they
encompass the well-being of other persons whose activities conduce
to our own physical security. We are social beings who live in societies
in which there is a pronounced division of labor that makes the security
of one person dependent upon the security of other persons in a variety
of ways—some more abstract, some less abstract.
Here is perhaps an example from the extreme and quite abstract side
of the spectrum: people legitimately worry about the economic prospects
of the next generation for a variety of reasons. First, while globalization
is likely to expand the total pool of material resources, it will also
redistribute them through the outsourcing of work. Pro-globalization
experts estimate that perhaps thirty to forty million jobs in the United

19.

Don Marquis, Why Abortion Is Immoral, 86 J. PHIL. 183, 196 (1989).

867

HIMMA ARTICLE POST-AUTHOR PAGES (SUPER FINAL).DOC

2/7/2008 2:40:09 PM

States will be lost in coming decades to the globalization process,20
benefiting the countries that get these jobs, as well as the owners of the
multinationals that redistribute these jobs, and harming those persons in
this country who lose those jobs—if they are not, as some dissenters
believe, easily replaced.
Second, although the value of our GDP, around $13.8 trillion in 2007,
continues to grow,21 so does our tax burden, now at over $5 trillion, and
our federal debt, now at over $9 trillion, with about $2 trillion held by
foreign governments.22 Approximately $430 billion per year must be spent
by the government merely to service the public debt—pay interest
without reducing principal.23 Baby boomers at the peak of their earning
power and at the peak of the amounts that they pay in taxes are going to
retire in droves in coming years, reducing the amount of tax revenues
they contribute towards the federal budget, but also reducing the amount
that they contribute towards servicing the debt. Unless boomers leave a
sufficient amount in inheritance to significantly reduce the debt burden
after inheritance taxes, which assumes that they remain healthy and die
suddenly without having to dip into their savings for extended aroundthe-clock health care, the next generation will have to pay an increasing
amount of their income in taxes to service the debt and possibly, if taxes
are raised, to ensure continuation of the same governmental services.
One can also expect that baby boomers will not continue to consume
at existing lavish levels. This means that not only will tax revenues fall
with the mass retirement of the boomers, but consumer demand also will
fall significantly, further reducing the demand for jobs in this country. If
people are buying less, far fewer people are needed to sell those goods.
Unemployment rates may hit some highs not seen since the recession of
the 1970s—or perhaps since the Great Depression.

20. Alan S. Blinder, Free Trade’s Great, But Offshoring Rattles Me, WASH. POST, May 6,
2007, at B04, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/04/
AR2007050402555.html. Alan S. Blinder is a professor of economics at Princeton University,
vice chairman of Promontory Interfinancial Network, and vice chairman of the G7
Group. Id. He is considered one of the most ardent proponents of globalization.
21. I NTERNATIONAL M ONETARY F UND , W ORLD E CONOMIC AND F INANCIAL
S URVEYS (Oct. 2007), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/02/weodata/
index.aspx (follow “By Countries” hyperlink, follow “Major Advanced Economies” hyperlink,
select “United States,” select all “National Accounts” and follow “Prepare Report”
hyperlink).
22. U.S. DEP’T. OF THE TREASURY, PUBLIC DEBT REPORTS, http://www.treasurydirect.gov
/NP/BPDLogin?application=np (last visited Jan. 21, 2008); John W. Schoen,
Commentary, Just Who Owns the U.S. National Debt?, MSNBC, Mar. 4, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17424874/.
23. Joint Statement of Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec’y of the Treasury, and Jim
Nussle, Dir. of the Office of Mgmt. and Budget, on Budget Results for Fiscal Year 2007
(Oct. 11, 2007), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp603.htm.
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Third, many economists are concerned that retired boomers will start
selling off stock assets in their portfolios, resulting in a rash of sell
orders that significantly depresses the value of the stock and of existing
portfolios held by younger persons. If so, younger persons face not only
the specter of fewer meaningful job opportunities and increased tax
burdens, but also portfolios that are suddenly worth significantly less in
value.
Fourth, the consensus among scientists is that global warming caused
by greenhouse gas emissions will eventually culminate in significant
changes in global climate adversely affecting the economies of many
nations, especially the developing nations in Africa. Republicans put
off, as a matter of economic platform, trying to do anything that
significantly reduces greenhouse gas emissions because, they claim, they
are skeptical about the evidence for the greenhouse gas theory of global
warming. More likely, they resist environmental protection focused on
reducing such emissions because it has an immediate cost to the
economy in the form of increased prices for vehicles and gasoline,
thereby leading to reduced demand and eventually to the loss of even
more jobs. If the theory is true and the predictions for the effects on
future climate patterns are true, the next generation will not have the
luxury of putting off facing the problems. The consequences will have
to be addressed by significant outlays of governmental revenue, which is
another reason to worry that the next generation’s tax burden will be
much greater and will significantly reduce their standard of living to
such an extent that they will be the first generation in history to be less
prosperous than their parents.
Finally, the threat of global terrorism imposes significant economic
costs on government that will continue to have to be funded with tax
revenues or deficit spending. Either way, when the boomers begin to
retire, the next generation will have to contribute increasing amounts of
their gross income to ensure national security, provided that the United
States does not radically change its foreign policy objectives in the
Middle East from protecting its own interests to pursuing a just and
lasting peace among nations, regardless of whether their interests coincide
with our own. Given our sad record on this score—as is well known, we
have a sad record of supporting despots hated by the people over whom
they rule who oppress them with the threat of torture and imprisonment
simply to ensure the continuation of a strategically valuable alliance—I
am not optimistic.
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The idea here is that, taken together, these considerations constitute a
serious threat to the economic prospect of the next generation that is
sufficiently grave, on my view, as to be properly characterized as a
threat to their security. If the above considerations turn out to be true,
we may see a significant drop in disposable income figures—a trend that
does not necessarily implicate security interests because it need not
reach the point where it threatens the satisfaction of basic needs. But we
might also see much higher rates of unemployment than we have seen
since the Great Depression—a trend that does implicate security interests,
as unemployment rates positively correlate with rates of homelessness,
substance abuse, mental illness, hunger, and diminished access to health
care of every kind.
In this kind of economic case, however, the threat arises because of
changes in behavior over a large class of persons. Of course, an
economic threat rising to the level of a security threat can be precipitated
by one person, such as a thief or embezzler, but threats that result from
general downward trends in economic activity represent threats arising
from the changes in the behavior of the many players in the various
markets for goods and services. The range of security interests includes
serious threats to economic well-being that result from changes in the
behavior of very large numbers of people.
This is not particularly controversial. If the entire Canadian population
suddenly stormed the U.S. borders in an attempt to wage war against the
United States, it would constitute a threat to our security both as individuals
and as members of a society whose existence ensures our survival and
well-being. In part, what explains the moral importance of security interests
is not just the content of certain interests they include, such as life, but
the range of interests and range of threats that are encompassed by this
notion. As was true of the concept of privacy, an analysis of the concept
of security entails nothing about whether our interests are protected by
morality; substantive argument is needed to do this work. But understanding
the concept of privacy helps us to see that the idea that such interests are
of moral significance is both intelligible and plausible; the same is true
of an analysis of the concept of security, conceived of as including
serious threats to economic interests. Even at this preliminary point, one
would expect security interests to be, at the very least, deserving, as a
matter of political morality, of legal protection.
B. Interests in Personal vs. Collective Security
As it turns out, the concept of security is ambiguous as between two
interpretations. My interest in personal security extends no further than
my having an interest in my own security. Accordingly, my interest in
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personal security is concerned with my being protected from violent acts
of assault and theft, but is indifferent with respect to other people being
protected from such acts. My interest in collective security is an interest
I have in the continuing existence of the social group I inhabit as providing
an environment in which I and other people are free from the threats of
violence and theft, and hence, which provides necessary, though not
sufficient, prerequisites for the possibility of leading a meaningful
human life. My interest in “national security,” of course, is an interest in
collective security—in particular, an interest in the continuing existence
of the national group to which I belong.
There is, of course, an obvious relation between the two: if I live in a
society that lacks collective security, then it is highly probable that I will
also lack personal security. If people everywhere are rioting, then my
individual, or personal, well-being is threatened—to some extent—even
if I am sitting at home with all the doors bolted shut. If I feel I have to
sit in a “safe room” to escape the direct threat to my security, then I am
no longer leading a meaningful, flourishing life. For all practical purposes,
my life is organized around defending myself from attacks on my life—
surely not a desirable state of affairs for any practically rational being.
It might be that some persons are so selfish that they care about
collective security only insofar as it impacts their own security, but I
would be surprised—at the risk of overestimating the capacity for human
empathy—if this were generally true. There is no doubt that there are
many people with pathological psychological conditions who care only
about their own interests and would hence care about collective security
only because it bears on their personal security; for these people, the
interests of other people count for nothing. But most people who share a
communal life with us in society form social bonds—bonds that extend
to people we have never met in virtue of their being a member of the
same tribe or community. Although the empathetic bonds extended to
those solely in virtue of tribe membership will be considerably weaker
than those extended in virtue of the development of mutually satisfying
personal relationships, they are significant bonds. Most of us who
watched the floodwaters rise on people clinging for life on their roofs in
New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina cared very deeply
about what was happening to them. We care, of course, about our own
security, but we also care a great deal about the security of our
community—and not just because it bears on our safety and security.

871

HIMMA ARTICLE POST-AUTHOR PAGES (SUPER FINAL).DOC

2/7/2008 2:40:09 PM

I believe that morality protects some of these interests in collective
and personal security to such an extent that they rise to the level of a
right. Nevertheless, it is not at all clear how to draw the line between
those interests not covered by a right to security and those interests
covered by a right to security—and I cannot attempt to do so here.
The point I want to make here is that I am perfectly comfortable
assuming our moral interests in privacy rise to the level of a right that a
legitimate state is obligated to protect as a precondition of its legitimacy,
and that, as I will show from a number of vantage points, the same is
true of the right to security. In addition, I will provide a number of
arguments—some of them grounded in individual morality and some
grounded in major approaches to theorizing about the conditions a state
must satisfy to be morally legitimate—that the right to security trumps
the right to privacy when the two come into conflict.
IV. WHAT EXACTLY DOES “SECURITY TRUMPS PRIVACY” MEAN?
The meaning of the claim that security trumps privacy is not
immediately obvious. At the outset, this much has been clear: if it is true
that security trumps privacy, then it is also true that privacy is not an
absolute right. Since the slogan that security trumps privacy entails that
when security and privacy are in some sort of direct conflict, security
defeats privacy, it follows that privacy is not absolute.24
But, quite frankly, this does not tell us much; the claim that privacy is
nonabsolute does not tell us anything about how it should be weighed
against other nonabsolute rights, and I do not wish to claim that security
is an absolute right because I think this thesis is as counterintuitive as the
thesis that privacy is an absolute right. If it were true, for example, that
security was an absolute right, and privacy necessarily yields in the
event of any conflict at all, then it would follow that it is morally
justifiable for the state to sacrifice all interests in privacy if necessary to
achieve just the slightest gain in security. I take this to be so obviously
false as to constitute a counterexample to the claim that security is
absolute, at least relative to privacy.
The claim that security trumps privacy is meant to express the more
intuitive, but admittedly vague, idea that security and privacy are
commensurable values and that, as a general matter, security is a more
24. I am deeply indebted to David Brink for making me aware of the need to
address this issue in some way, although all I can really do here is acknowledge the
epistemic issues that would have to be worked out in order to fully flesh out the content
of the claim that security trumps privacy. I have no illusions that I have said anywhere
near enough to deal adequately with his concerns or with the theoretical issue presented
here. That will have to be a topic for another paper.
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important value from the standpoint of morality than privacy. This does
not commit me to the claim that all values are commensurable; perhaps
there are two values that simply cannot be weighed against one another.
But it does commit me to the claim that there is a hierarchy of
commensurable morally protected interests and rights, which include
security, privacy, and perhaps others, and that security has a higher
position in the hierarchy than privacy. Indeed, I am tempted to think
that security interests—construed to include freedom from grievous
threats to well-being, which include death, grievous bodily injury, and
financial damage sufficiently extensive to threaten the satisfaction of
basic needs and hence survival of a person—are at the top of the moral
hierarchy, encompassing as they do the rights to life and physical
preservation.
The epistemology of resolving conflicts among rights is somewhat
easier in the case of other interests that are not quite as broad as the
security interest, as defined here. To say that the right to life trumps the
right to property seems to entail that if one is confronted with a choice in
which one has to damage one person’s property or end the life of another
person, it will always be the case that the right thing to do is to damage
the property.
The epistemological problem of articulating a methodology for
balancing competing security and privacy claims is quite difficult, and I
cannot claim to be able to do that here because security might, in
general, be more important than privacy, but privacy interests sometimes
win in a conflict with security interests. It would not, for example, be
permissible to disclose the most private information of one thousand
people to save one person from being bruised severely on her leg. The
relevant elements of the respective interests fall well short of being of
comparable importance relevant to the privacy and security of affected
persons.
Given the difficulties associated with working out a detailed epistemology
of weighing competing privacy and security claims, I will have to
content myself here with resting on another less than fully perspicuous
formula to express my view. Other things being equal, a security interest
defeats a privacy interest that has the same level of moral importance to
privacy that the first element has to security.
Here is an example of what I have in mind, but it will fall far short of
providing the sort of epistemic principle that would enable us to sort
these issues out. If the life of one innocent person is at stake and can be
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saved only by disclosing the most private information of another innocent
person, it is morally permissible, though obviously regrettable, to disclose
that information in order to save the life. Here the most important value
protected by security comes into conflict with the most important value
protected by information privacy; the result in this case is that the
security interest is more important.
Of course, this case—as well as the case in which we can save
someone from a bruised leg only by disclosing the most private information
of one thousand people—is theoretically uninteresting because it is so
easily resolved. The cases of real interest are those posed by various
provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act where there is no consensus
among theorists and laypersons about how to balance the competing
interests—even where it is clear that there is a genuine conflict that a
particular provision is intended to resolve.
One conspicuous class of issues involves how to compare a case in
which some more important element of security that involves a small
class of persons, possibly consisting of one, is weighed against some less
important element that involves a much larger class of persons. There
are two dimensions to balancing these interests: (1) the importance of
the interest relative to the type of interest involved; and (2) the number
of people whose interests in security are implicated compared to the
number of people whose interests in privacy are implicated. Both factors
count for something in the weighing process, but I have disappointingly
little to say by way of clarifying how the latter issue should be worked
out. Again, the epistemological challenges are so difficult, multifaceted,
and nuanced that I could not even begin to take a stab at them here.
How to resolve either issue in a principled way is not something I can
admit to having even the beginnings of a theoretical account for; I
merely want to make a multifaceted case that security interests are, as a
general matter, ranked more highly on the hierarchy of commensurable
moral values than privacy interests. This would entail that the class of
all security interests possessed in whatever form by every person is more
important, from the standpoint of morality, than the class of all privacy
interests possessed in whatever from by the same individual. This, as we
have seen, is compatible with situations in which someone’s privacy
interests defeat someone else’s security interests.
But something like a detailed epistemology would be needed to make
out a rigorous theoretical explanation of the idea that, other things being
equal, security interests trump privacy interests that are as important to
privacy as the security interests are to security. First, one would need
some sort of vertical ranking of both security and privacy interests that
includes some mechanism for deciding where along the spectrum of
privacy and security interests competing interests are of comparable
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internal importance. Thus, for example, it is easy to see that life trumps
the most private facts about oneself, but not so easy to see where the
interest in financial security lines up with other information about oneself
that is private. Second, one would have to come up with a calculus for
aggregating security and privacy interests across persons so that they can
be properly weighed against one another. Is one life more valuable than
the most private information of ten people? One hundred? One thousand?
The problem here arises because the number of persons whose security
interests are implicated might not be the same as the number whose
privacy interests are implicated. Finally, one has to have some sort of
reasonably accurate probability calculus for determining the likelihood
that a measure proposing a trade of privacy for security will result in
securing the appropriate increase in security without causing a greater
diminishment in privacy than can be justified by that increase. As is
readily evident, these are three quite difficult problems to work out.
In closing, I should point out that privacy interests and security
interests are commensurable in the sense that they can at least sometimes
be compared and weighed accurately in the case of conflict. This is
surely so some of the time; as noted above, the interest someone has in
the privacy of information about his being homosexual cannot outweigh
the interests of 300,000 people whose lives depend on the disclosure
of that information. This, of course, is a far-fetched case, but it demonstrates
beyond doubt that privacy and security interests will frequently be
commensurable along both dimensions—the dimension of importance
and the dimension of assessing that importance across different size
classes of individuals—a prerequisite for being able to claim that, as a
general matter, security interests, properly defined, are more important,
other things being equal, than informational privacy interests.
This, however, should not be taken to imply that security and privacy
interests are always commensurable. It might be that sometimes conflicts
arise between security interests and privacy interests that cannot
accurately be weighed because they are simply incommensurable values.
For example, some property interests might not be commensurable with
some privacy interests; sentimental attachments that are vital to a person’s
sense of well-being might—or might not be—commensurable with
informational privacy interests. Nothing in the thesis of this essay should
be construed to imply that we can always resolve conflicts—or even that
an omniscient God can always do so—because nothing in this essay
should be construed as implying or presupposing that it is a necessary
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truth that the relevant values are commensurable. I would surmise that
in the vast majority of cases they surely are, but there might be some
small class of cases in which they are not. I am not entirely sure of
whether this latter claim is true, but the issue is much too complicated to
take on here. I simply want to gesture in the direction of the potential
concerns here.
V. THE ARGUMENT FROM INTUITIVE CASE JUDGMENTS
From an intuitive standpoint, the idea that the right to privacy is an
absolute right seems utterly implausible. Intuitively, it seems clear that
there are other rights that are so much more important that they easily
trump privacy rights in the event of a conflict. For example, if a psychologist
knows that a patient is highly likely to commit a murder, then it is, at the
very least, morally permissible to disclose that information about the
patient in order to prevent the crime—regardless of whether such
information would otherwise be protected by privacy rights. Intuitively,
it seems clear that life is more important from the standpoint of morality
than any of the interests protected by a moral right to privacy.
Still one often hears—primarily from academics in information
schools and library schools, especially in connection with the controversy
regarding the USA PATRIOT Act—the claim that privacy should never
be sacrificed for security, implicitly denying what I take to be the
underlying rationale for the PATRIOT Act. This also seems counterintuitive
because it does not seem unreasonable to believe we have a moral right
to security that includes the right to life. Although this right to security
is broader than the right to life, the fact that security interests include our
interests in our lives implies that the right to privacy trumps even the
right to life—something that seems quite implausible from an intuitive
point of view. If I have to give up the most private piece of information
about myself to save my life or protect myself from either grievous
bodily injury or financial ruin, I would gladly do so without hesitation.
There are many things I do not want you to know about me, but should
you make a credible threat to my life, bodily integrity, financial security,
or health, and then hook me up to a lie detector machine, I will truthfully
answer any question you ask about me. I value my privacy a lot, but I
value my life, bodily integrity, and financial security much more than
any of the interests protected by the right to privacy.
It is true, of course, that the hierarchy defined by my personal
attributions of value may not reflect the hierarchy implied by the moral
values themselves, but I would be surprised if there are any rational
persons who would react differently to the choice presented above.
Personal valuations can be idiosyncratic and for this reason not tell us
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anything about the corresponding moral values. But if it is true, as I
would hypothesize, that very few, if any, people would choose to withhold
some piece of private information about themselves if needed to save
their lives, or protect them from serious physical injury or financial ruin,
that is a pretty good reason to think that these valuations do tell us
something about morality. It would be very odd if, on the one hand, all,
or nearly all, rational persons assign greater value to what I have described
as the most important of security interests than to the most important of
privacy interests where there is a genuine conflict between the two but,
on the other hand, morality assigned more value to privacy than to
security.
It is fairly easy to see, however, that my intuitions are widely shared in
the United States. As an empirical matter, citizens in the United States
frequently indicate a willingness to trade privacy for enhanced security.
For example, a Harris poll conducted on October 4, 2004, three years
after the attacks of 9/11, produced the following results:
•
•
•

•

•
•
•

Two-thirds (67%) percent favor “closer monitoring of banking and credit
card transactions” up slightly from 64 percent in February (and down
from 81 percent in September 2001).
Six in ten (60%) favor “adoption of a national I.D. system for all U.S.
citizens” up from February’s 56 percent (down from 68% in September
2001).
Those who favor “law enforcement monitoring of Internet discussions”
[have] increased significantly from 50 percent earlier this year to a
current 59 percent. This is only somewhat lower than the 63 percent who
felt this way in September 2001.
Those who favor “expanded government monitoring of cell phones and
email” have risen to 39 percent, with 56 percent opposed. In February
this year, a somewhat lower 36 percent minority favored this.
....
83 percent continue to favor “stronger document and physical security
checks for travelers,” basically unchanged since February (93% in
September 2001).
82 percent continue to support “expanded undercover activity to
penetrate groups under suspicion,” up from 80 percent in the February
poll (93% in September 2001).
60 percent continue to support “expanded camera surveillance on streets and
in public places,” virtually unchanged since February (63% in September
2001).25

25. HARRIS INTERACTIVE, THE HARRIS POLL #73: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF LIKELIHOOD OF
FUTURE TERRORIST ATTACK LEADS TO CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR TOUGH SURVEILLANCE
MEASURES TO PREVENT TERRORISM (2004), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/
index.asp?PID=501.

877

HIMMA ARTICLE POST-AUTHOR PAGES (SUPER FINAL).DOC

2/7/2008 2:40:09 PM

One might be tempted to argue that these results should not be taken as
typical because the poll was taken only three years after the 9/11 attacks,
and people have become somewhat more critical of late of the
government’s efforts to combat terrorism that implicate privacy. But the
claim is not that the people always favor enhanced security measures
even when they impinge on privacy interests; the claim is rather that
when people are convinced that they face a credible deadly threat of
some sort—that is, one that satisfies some threshold level of probability
for success—they are generally willing to sacrifice privacy interests,
even important ones, to reduce the probability of success. Criticisms of
recent measures primarily express the view that they impinge upon
privacy without significantly reducing the probability of a terrorist
attack on U.S. soil. That, unlike the poll results described above, tells us
nothing about common intuitions regarding how to balance security and
privacy as a general matter.
More tellingly, people will frequently choose to give up a variety of
more important interests to protect security interests. A 1996 poll found
that 77% of Russians valued social order over democracy and hence can
be interpreted as believing that security interests are more important than
autonomy interests, while only 9% valued democracy over social order.26
This not only speaks to the fact that ordinary intuitions commonly
converge upon valuing security interests over other interests like privacy
and autonomy, but also attests to the ill-advisedness of the sort of market
fundamentalism embraced by the International Monetary Fund in
attempting to remake the former Soviet Union in the image of the
United States by immediately transforming the Russian economy from
being centrally organized around state planning and state ownership of
the means of production to one of essentially unrestricted free enterprise.
The result has been a disaster; some Russians have gotten very rich,
while others fall behind economically and are far more vulnerable to
falling victim to crime of all kinds, leaving overall a diminished sense of
well-being among the Russian people. Sadly, this is a mistake that the
IMF continues to repeat all over the developing world—although this
might be explained, in part, by the fact that Western multinational
corporations almost always somehow find a way to come out ahead
because these corporations derive the benefit of economic protectionist
mechanisms, like tariffs, that make it impossible for developing nations
to compete.
If this is true, and it is also true, as I am assuming, that individuals
have a moral right to privacy that is sufficiently important from the

26.
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standpoint of political morality that states are obligated to protect it as a
condition of moral legitimacy, then it follows that individuals have a
moral right to security that is sufficiently important from the standpoint
of political morality that states are obligated to protect it as a condition
of moral legitimacy; if morality affords more protection to X than to Y
and morality protects Y as a right, then it follows that morality protects X
as a right. Moreover, insofar as morality provides more protection to the
right to security than the right to privacy, it follows that the right to
security outweighs the right to privacy, other things being equal—whatever
that ultimately turns out to mean. Insofar as political morality requires,
as a condition of state legitimacy, the protection of the moral right to Y
by legal restrictions on behavior, it also requires, as a condition of state
legitimacy, the protection of the moral right to X if X is of greater moral
importance than Y. Since privacy and security can clearly conflict on
matters central to each, it follows that the right to privacy is not absolute.
Of course, arguments of this sort can take us only so far. First,
whether or not intuitions converge on a moral issue is a contingent
matter that can only be determined by empirical sociological inquiry,
something I am not prepared to do. Second, there may be more compelling
general theoretical considerations that contradict these intuitions and
convince us to give them up to achieve general coherence in our belief
structure. Third, one person’s intuitions about the importance of life relative
to the most private facts about her provides very limited evidence for the
claim that, other things being equal, security trumps privacy. Finally, in
the absence of the appropriate metric for ranking privacy and security on
their own hierarchies and a means of determining when security and
privacy interests fall on comparable spots in that hierarchy, these
intuitions, widespread though they might be—as reflected in the polls
described above—will not tell us anything more than that privacy rights
or interests are not absolute. They will not tell us that, other things being
equal, security is the more important value.
VI. CONSIDERATIONS OF INTRINSIC AND INSTRUMENTAL VALUE
In determining what morally protected interests people might have,
philosophers frequently distinguish two kinds of value. An entity has
instrumental value if and only if it has value as a means to some other
valuable end. In contrast, an entity has intrinsic value if and only if it
has value as an end in itself. Money is an example of something with
only instrumental value; while money clearly has value as a means to
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other ends like nutrition and recreation, it does not seem to have any
value as an end in itself. In contrast, one’s own happiness is an example
of something with intrinsic value. While it might make sense to value
some other person’s happiness as a means to some other end, it makes
little sense to think of one’s own happiness as primarily a means to some
other end.
There are two concepts of intrinsic value that make use of this distinction—
one primarily normative, and the other primarily descriptive. The normative
concept is concerned with what rational moral agents ought to value as
deserving of respect as ends in themselves. An entity intrinsically
valuable in this sense has value as an end in itself, regardless of whether
any rational agents actually value it this way. Thus, attributions of this
kind of value are normative in the sense they are independent of the
actual valuations of rational agents: if every rational agent failed to value
an entity E with intrinsic value in this sense, each would be making a
moral mistake. Attributions of intrinsic value in this normative sense are
disconnected from what we actually value as an empirical matter.
Entities with intrinsic value in this sense are moral patients entitled to
moral respect. Unlike something with only instrumental value, something
with intrinsic value may not be used by an agent without some thought
to its interests. Whereas the appropriate manner for thinking about
things with only instrumental value is cost-benefit analysis, intrinsically
valuable things have a right to some consideration in a moral agent’s
deliberations. For example, if nonhuman animals have intrinsic value in
this sense, moral agents have an obligation to consider their interests in
deliberations about acts that may affect those interests.
In contrast, the descriptive concept is concerned with identifying the
sort of ends we characteristically pursue; the issue here is what, as an
empirical matter, we typically regard worth pursuing for its own sake.
An entity has intrinsic value in this sense if and only if, as an empirical
matter, most of us actually value it as an end in itself; a thing has
instrumental value if and only if most of us value it as a means.
The moral significance of being regarded as an end in itself by moral
persons—that is, of having intrinsic value in the descriptive sense—is
different from that of being owed an obligation of respect—that is, of
having intrinsic value in the normative sense. As persons, we have a
morally protected interest in what we typically intrinsically value that is
fundamental in not deriving from some other more basic interest.
Persons have a special moral status in the world in virtue of being, or
potentially being, both moral agents with obligations and moral patients
with rights. Respect for beings with this status entails some measure of
respect for their characteristic ultimate ends.
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This helps to explain why we have fundamental moral rights to life
and liberty. It is surely true that we view our lives and our liberty as
instrumentally valuable; being free and alive are necessary conditions
for pursuing a life that is happy. But it is also clearly true, I think, that
we typically view continued conscious existence and liberty as vitally
important ends in themselves; we care passionately about these things
for their own sakes—and not merely because they are useful for other
purposes. Given the vital intrinsic importance of these ends, it is not
surprising that they are the objects of fundamental rights.
Still, the fact that we intrinsically value these states does not fully
explain why we have rights protecting them. Whether and to what extent
morality affords protection to a person’s interest in her ultimate ends
depends on the nature of these ends and on the extent to which they can
be adequately protected by moral rules given facts about human nature
and the social arrangements under which we live. Although my interest
in my life as an end in itself is clearly protected by a right to life, my
interest in my happiness as an end in itself is not protected by a right to
happiness. My achieving happiness can be facilitated by my rights to
life and liberty, but my happiness depends on a host of factors that
cannot be protected by the characteristic mechanisms of moral and legal
obligation. It makes no sense to think that a woman with whom I am in
love is morally obligated to return that love—even though my happiness
may depend crucially on her loving me the way I love her. A person’s
happiness depends on the job she gets, the social connections she enjoys,
and the sense of her own worth. These are simply not the kinds of things
that can be protected or guaranteed by rights and obligations—moral or
otherwise—in part, because such protections would infringe, without
adequate justification, the rights of other people; surely, every person has a
moral right to decide for herself with whom she is in love. Accordingly,
the characteristic assignment of intrinsic value to X is not a sufficient
condition for having a fundamental right to X.
Surprisingly, the characteristic assignment of intrinsic value to X is not
even a necessary condition for having a fundamental right to X. Many
persons believe we have a fundamental moral right to property, but it
seems clear that property does not have value as an end in itself; someone
who pursues property for its own sake, rather than as a means to other
ends, seems to have badly misunderstood the value of property.
One does not, of course, have to take the position that property is a
natural moral right, rather than a social right conferred by society. The

881

HIMMA ARTICLE POST-AUTHOR PAGES (SUPER FINAL).DOC

2/7/2008 2:40:09 PM

idea that we have a moral right to take things external to our persons out
of a commons is somewhat less natural than the idea that we have a
moral right to life, which does not extend beyond the physical boundaries of
our own person and thus affords no right to things external to us. Indeed,
the idea that property rights are moral in character has been notoriously
difficult to defend; the best strategy continues to be a Lockean strategy
that grants us such a right to things when we invest our labor in them
and create new value, but no one has adequately explained why it is not
equally reasonable to conclude that, as a moral matter, we lose our labor
when we put it into something external to ourselves.
Instead, one can conceive of property as a social right but, either way,
what explains why we have a right to property undoubtedly makes
reference to the importance of property to well-being. Not only does it
seem necessary for our survival that we can exclude persons from
appropriating at least some material objects, it also seems that excluding
others from appropriating an object O that satisfies some want always
has instrumental value because it endows O with exchange value that
enables O to be exchanged for another object that can satisfy some want.
The importance of property to well-being certainly plays a role in our
having a right to property—regardless of whether it is social or moral in
character.
But what explains why a right to property is fundamental has to do
with the relationship of its content to the content of other rights. While
property might be necessary for survival, the right to life does not imply
a right to property. My right to life implies that you are obligated not to
kill me, but it does not imply that you are obligated to refrain from
appropriating all objects, including those not necessary for my survival,
that I have claimed as my own. The right to exclude other persons from
appropriating an object, which is central to the notion of a property right,
may conduce in some cases to survival, and hence, relates to the interest
in life, but it cannot be derived from the right to life. Insofar as similar
things can be said about the relationship of the right to property to other
fundamental rights, the right to property is fundamental despite the fact
that property lacks intrinsic value.
There is no general rule linking fundamental rights and instrumental
value. There might be many entities we characteristically value as a
means without having rights to them. For example, it seems reasonable
to think that we typically value sexual experience as a means to some
deeper intimacy or as a means of affirming our sexual identities. But it
would not follow that we have some sort of right to sexual experience—
though we obviously have basic liberty rights that entitle us to pursue
such experiences within limits. How much protection, if any, morality
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affords our interest in what we instrumentally value presumably differs
from interest to interest.
In any event, the following can safely be said about the significance of
rights that protect what is intrinsically valuable relative to rights that
protect what is instrumentally valuable. If X is a right that protects something
that is instrumentally valuable as a means to Y, something that is intrinsically
valuable and protected by a right, Y is the more important value of the
two from the standpoint of morality because the value of X derives from
the value of Y in the following sense: but for the intrinsic value of Y, X
would not be instrumentally important, and hence, would receive no
moral protection.
It seems to follow that rights the value of which is purely instrumental
are not as important as rights providing the ends to which the former
rights are intended to secure. If our interests in X is purely instrumental
as a means to securing Y, and both X and Y are morally protected in
virtue of our interests in them, it seems clear that what is of ultimate
importance from the standpoint of morality is Y. X is protected only
because it facilitates the achievement of Y. If X did not conduce to Y in
the appropriate way, X would not be protected, but Y would be, other
things being equal. Since Y is the interest of ultimate value that is not
contingent upon securing something else of moral importance, and X
lacks this property, it seems reasonable to conclude that, from the
standpoint of morality, Y is more important an interest than X.
This is surely true of property. As John Locke points out, we need to
be able to consume material things to survive and to flourish in all the
ways that human beings ought, as a moral matter, to flourish.27 Property
is ultimately protected then because of its crucial instrumentality to the
achievement of these ends: without property, neither brute survival nor a
morally meaningful life is possible. But clearly property is less important
than brute survival; and property is also less important than whatever
aspects of human flourishing to which property is essential that are
deemed significant enough to be ultimate ends protected by morality.
This explains why property rights are less important than rights to life
and liberty—though neither of the latter need necessarily be construed as
being absolute.

27. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE
ed., Hackett 1980) (1690).
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The same also seems to be true of the right to informational privacy
and the right to, or interest in, security. Informational privacy is valuable
only as a means to an end. If certain pieces of information about me
were not likely to be used in ways that have damaging consequences to
my well-being, I would not care one bit whether they were widely
known. My hair is dirty blond, something I take no pains to hide
because the risk that someone will use this information to discriminate
against me in some way that significantly diminishes my well-being is
virtually nil. In contrast, I care about personal information about my
health because my being at high genetic risk for a particular disease, if
this turns out to be true, might lead a potential employer not to hire me.
There is no piece of personal information about myself that I value keeping
private as an end in itself; privacy is all about avoiding embarrassing and
otherwise damaging social consequences.
Security, on the other hand, is something I value instrumentally because it
is a precondition for living a meaningful, enjoyable human life, but it is
also something I value intrinsically. Continued sentient existence, bodily
integrity—for example, having four limbs that I can move by volition—
and financial security are ends in themselves and hence intrinsically
valuable. Indeed, in many cases, I value privacy of information as a means
to protecting security interests that I value intrinsically. Insofar as this is
true, it seems reasonable to conclude that security is a more important
value than privacy from the vantage point of individual and political
morality.
This seems to be a view shared by other theorists. John Finnis, for
example, attempts to identify those things we value intrinsically as the
“basic goods” that are ultimately the subjects of foundational moral
principles. Rejecting the claim that there are no values that are universally
shared across cultures, Finnis identifies the following values as forming
the foundation for moral rules:
Students of ethics and of human cultures very commonly assume that cultures
manifest preferences, motivations, and evaluations so wide and chaotic in their
variety that no values or practical principles can be said to be self-evident to
human beings . . . .
. . . [But recent anthropological] surveys entitle us . . . to make some confident
assertions. All human societies show a concern for the value of human life; in
all, self-preservation is generally accepted as a proper motive for action, and in
none is the killing of other human beings permitted without some fairly definite
justification. All human societies regard the procreation of a new human life as
in itself a good thing unless there are special circumstances. No human society
fails to restrict sexual activity; in all societies there is some prohibition of incest,
some opposition to boundless promiscuity and to rape, some favour for stability
and permanence in sexual relations. All human societies display a concern for
truth, through education of the young in matters not only practical (e.g.
avoidance of dangers) but also speculative or theoretical (e.g. religion). Human
beings, who can survive infancy only by nurture, live in or on the margins of
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some society which invariably extends beyond the nuclear family, and all
societies display a favour for the values of co-operation, of common over
individual good, of obligation between individuals, and of justice within groups.
All know friendship. All have some conception of meum and tuum, title or
property, and of reciprocity. All value play, serious and formalized, or relaxed
and recreational.28

On Finnis’s view, these values are sought as ends in themselves in all
cultures and societies across all times and constitute universal intrinsic
values that form the goods that are foundational to human well-being
and flourishing. As such, these goods define the basic principles of morality
that protect people in their pursuit of such goods by creating rights and
obligations and encourage such pursuit by characterizing it as “good.”
Finnis’s view should not be construed as implying that anything
omitted from the list receives no protection whatsoever from morality.
His intent here is simply to identify the foundational goods—that is, the
goods that are sought as ends in themselves because their achievement is
constitutive of a good, flourishing human life. Insofar as some X is
essential to achieving one of the basic goods and is not otherwise
morally objectionable, it is reasonable to think that morality will afford
some protection to efforts on the part of persons to achieve X; but, again,
the value of X will be derivative of and of less importance than the value
of the basic good X is needed to achieve.
It is noteworthy here that Finnis’s list includes a number of values that
would count as interests in security, but none that would count as
privacy interests not ultimately derivable from some other interest on the
list. My interest in security includes, as I have mentioned, my interest in
life, my interest in living in a stable community that extends beyond the
boundaries of the nuclear family, and my interest in ensuring that I am
able to provide for my basic needs—which is secured by a protected
interest in property.
But nowhere in the list does anything that would count as an interest
in informational privacy appear; informational privacy might be necessary
in varying degrees in different cultures as a means to achieving some of
the basic goods, but its value, if Finnis is correct, is instrumental, rather
than intrinsic. This, of course, does not imply that it receives no protection
from morality; as noted above, what is a necessary means to an end that
receives moral protection is something that also receives moral protection,

28.

JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 83 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1980).
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but it is of less importance from the standpoint of morality than the
intrinsically valuable good it is essential to achieve.
Of course, one need not take Finnis as having gotten his list correct,
but it is noteworthy that theorists who attempt to justify privacy protection
in virtue of its value converge on characterizing its value, though not
necessarily explicitly, as wholly instrumental. Charles Fried characterizes
the value of privacy in terms of its value in facilitating intimate
relationships; the value of privacy is a means to the intrinsic goods of
personal intimacy.29 Edward Bloustein argues that informational privacy is
valuable as a means of protecting autonomy and one’s sense of self as
deserving of respect.30 James Rachels argues that informational privacy
protects against a number of harms and discriminatory behaviors as well
as helps us control our social relationships with others.31
To my knowledge, no author has made a plausible case that any
element of informational privacy is intrinsically valuable or counts as a
basic constituent of human well-being or flourishing. If privacy is purely
instrumentally valuable as a means to secure other goods, including
security, that are intrinsically valuable and are constitutive of human
well-being and flourishing, then it is reasonable to conclude that privacy
is less important, from the standpoint of morality, than security.
VII. CLASSICAL SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORIES
A “classical” social contract theory is one that grounds the beginnings
of an account of coercive state authority in an agreement that is actual in
the sense that every party to the agreement has either expressly promised
to be bound by the authority or done something that justifies attributing
a promise to that party; in the latter case, the promise is said to be “tacit”
or “implied.” Social contract theories that take this approach tend to
be “classical” in the more intuitive sense that they are, as a historical
matter, the earliest version of the theories, which also correctly suggests
that the approach of social contract theories has changed over time. I
take the social contract theories of Hobbes and Locke, while differing in
many respects, to be paradigmatic examples of classical social contract
theories.

29.
30.
31.
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A. The Structure of Classical Social Contract Theories
Classical social contract theories begin with the postulation of a
mythical presocial state, called the state of nature in which the goods
that are needed to satisfy basic needs are insufficient to satisfy the needs
of persons in that state. In the state of nature, there are none of the
benefits associated with our living together cooperatively in a society of
even the smallest scale.
To begin, there is no central authority of any kind, such as a state, to
coercively enforce rules that limit behavior in the state of nature. There
is hence nothing in the state of nature, other than a person’s own efforts,
to protect him or her from being victimized by other people. The only
limits on the behavior of other persons towards any particular citizen are
that citizen’s ability to fend off physical attacks and other sorts of
assaults on other interests he or she might have—such as an interest in
food he or she has gathered.
In consequence, there are no binding social bonds or agreements
possible. In the state of nature, it is always in an agent’s interest to cheat
on an agreement or promise—regardless of whether the other parties
cheat. If the other parties cheat, the agent must cheat simply to keep up.
If the other parties do not cheat, the agent can gain an unbargained-for
advantage by cheating. Since this is known to all in the state of nature,
cooperative arrangements are not possible.
This means that, in the state of nature, one has no friends, no relatives,
and no family ties—nothing in the state of nature that would constitute
the kind of social bond that makes possible mutual trust between
individuals or even unilateral trust of one person in another person.
Thus, there is nothing in the state of nature that would make cooperative
behavior, or teamwork, possible. One is completely on one’s own in the
state of nature; and since trust is not possible, one must constantly be on
guard against threats from other inhabitants.
Accordingly, there are none of the benefits that social cooperation
makes possible in the state of nature. There is no art or entertainment, of
course. But, more importantly, there is no technology of any kind that
would enable one to make certain tasks easier, increase one’s productivity,
or increase the stock of material resources available to one in the state of
nature. In the state of nature, one does have one’s wits to rely on; after
all, human beings remain rational in the sense of having certain problemsolving abilities that rely on conscious deliberation. But what a person
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will be able to do with her wits will be severely limited by the fact that
there is no history of trial and error, no science, and no education to
provide persons in the state of nature with any information from other
people they can work with. Presumably, one’s rational capacities in the
state of nature will be limited to enabling people to make fairly primitive
tools and weapons.
Material resources in the state of nature are extremely scarce in the
following sense. There is simply not enough of what human beings need
to survive to enable all persons in the state of nature to live a lifespan
that comes close to the average lifespan in the United States. Some will
die more quickly than others, but nearly all will die long before reaching
an age we in the twenty-first century take for granted as a probable
lifespan.
Taken together, these conditions ensure that life in the state of nature
will be violently competitive and, for that reason, extremely unpleasant.
It is not just a matter of everyone’s having to scratch out for themselves
the minimum resources needed to survive; one will have to engage in
some sort of fight or conflict with others to do this because resources are
so scarce. Here is how Hobbes famously describes life in the state of
nature:
Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power
to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and
such a warre, as is of every man against every man. . . .
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is
Enemy to every man; the same consequent to the time, wherein men live
without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention
shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry;
because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth;
no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no
commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as
require much force; No knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time;
no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continual feare, and
danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and
short.32

This terrible state of war of all against all that constitutes the state of
nature, as Hobbes describes it, is the alternative to life under some sort
of common authority with the ability to coercively enforce rules to
protect people against violence, theft, and other infringements of important
interests.
Hobbes and Locke, the first classical social contract theorists, differed
on whether morality governs life in the state of nature—Hobbes taking
the counterintuitive position that everything is permissible there; but
32. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 88–89 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1991) (1660).
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they clearly agreed that life in a state of nature is sufficiently unpleasant
that any practically rational person will want out and be willing to
sacrifice some measure of autonomy to a state in exchange for a similar
sacrifice on the part of all others. While Hobbes believed this meant that
people voluntarily submit to the authority of a sovereign whose authority
is unlimited in the sense that the sovereign can commit no moral wrong
against its subjects, Locke believed that people voluntarily submit to a
state authority that enacts laws through democratic procedures while
simultaneously respecting the natural moral rights to life, liberty, and
property that persons have even in the state of nature.33 Either way,
people are plausibly presumed to actually agree to be bound by the
common authority as a way of escaping the state of nature, which both
theorists believe is the only alternative to life in a society governed by a
sovereign entity of some kind with coercive authority.
B. Security vs. Privacy in Classical Social Contract Theories
It is clear that the primary motivation in the state of nature for submitting
to a coercive state authority is to escape the extreme unpleasantness
associated with life in that state. One’s physical security is always in
danger in the state of nature; one’s life is always in danger—whether
directly or indirectly. One must, most obviously, be on guard against
threats of deadly physical violence; the price of failure to be sufficiently
vigilant will frequently be grievous bodily injury or death. Less obviously,
one must guard against having one’s few possessions taken by other
persons.
Indeed, while Hobbes was pretty explicit that the very point of
submitting to the sovereign was to gain some measure of physical
security by giving up the unlimited freedom one has in the state of
nature, Locke believed that the very point of the state authority is to
protect property. Although it may therefore seem that Locke and Hobbes
disagree about the basic value that people submit to authority to achieve,
the appearance is misleading. Locke presumably believes that in the
state of nature the principal threat to security consists in the threat of
having one’s few possessions taken, assuming that the extreme scarcity
of the state of nature presents the primary threat to security against
which people have to guard.
33. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
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This is, in part, what explains a number of features of Locke’s famous
argument for natural property rights. First, Locke argues, in effect, that
people need to consume material objects in the commons to survive and
that the moral right of self-preservation ensures that there must be some
morally justified way to take things out of the state of nature and
appropriate them. Locke argued that we can acquire a property right in
an unowned object by mixing something to which we have a property
right—our labor—with that object in a way that creates new value. But
that is simply the mechanism Locke identifies as acquiring a moral
property right in something, which he has antecedently concluded must
exist as a consequence of our right to preserve our lives—and the
reasoning is compelling: if we have a moral right to Y, and X is a necessary
means to Y, then we have a moral right to X.34 The very foundation of
Locke’s argument for natural property rights is grounded in an interest in
the preservation of one’s life that is central to the notion of security.
Second, the compelling importance of the interest in security explains
one of the limitations on the natural property rights that the state is
morally obligated to protect. Locke famously limited the capacity to
acquire property rights in the state of nature to objects that belong to no
one—“original acquisition”—by two provisos, one more telling than the
other, for our purposes. The less relevant proviso is that one can never
acquire an object for the purpose of destroying or wasting it, which is
intended to try to preserve the stock of scarce resources as much as
possible. The more relevant proviso is that one can acquire a property
right in an otherwise unowned material object only if there was enough
of that object of similar quality left for everyone else. The idea here is
that original acquisition in these circumstances does not exacerbate the
conditions of scarcity that are likely to promote violent conflict among
persons; as Locke puts the point:
No Body could think himself injur’d by the drinking of another Man, though he
took a good Draught, who had a whole River of the same Water left him to
quench his thirst. And the Case of Land and Water, where there is enough of
both, is perfectly the same.35

Accordingly, the state’s most important obligation is to protect
property, on Locke’s view, precisely because the protection of property
will ensure the public peace and minimize threats to physical security.
Protection of property, though first among the state’s priorities, is a
34. It seems clear that people have a moral right to consume what they need to
survive if it does not belong to anyone else. But this gets us, at most, the existence of
moral property rights in objects needed to survive; it would not justify a moral right to
accumulate the amounts of property currently held by the world’s richest persons.
35. LOCKE, supra note 33, at 291.
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means to the ultimate end of protecting security by ending the war of all
against all that occurs in the state of nature. For classical social contract
theorists, then, the most important value that submission to state authority is
intended to pursue is security.
It follows, of course, that whatever the rest of the hierarchy of values
might look like, the value of privacy is less, according to classical social
contract theories, than the value of security. The rights to life and
freedom from intentionally inflicted grievous physical injury trump the
right to privacy, if such there be, when the latter comes into direct
conflict with the former. Of course, Locke would rank the right of property
alongside the other rights or interests mentioned above as constituting
the right or interest in security because he believes protection of property
is so important to protection of security. But classical social contract
theories all converge in implying (1) that the right or interest in privacy
is not absolute; and (2) that the right or interest in security trumps the
right or interest in privacy when the two come into direct conflict—
though neither theory tells us much about how or when these interests
might directly conflict.
VIII. CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORIES
A. John Rawls’s Justice as Fairness
Perhaps the most fundamental idea in John Rawls’s famous theory of
justice as fairness is “the idea of a society as a fair system of social
cooperation over time from one generation to the next.”36 Implicit in the
claim that society is a fair system of cooperation, as Rawls understands
that claim, are two further claims: (1) the terms that govern societal
cooperation ought to be reasonably acceptable to each participant;
and (2) those terms ought to be reasonable from the standpoint of the
participant’s own prudential interests.37 Accordingly, Rawls attempts to
identify the fair terms of cooperation by means of a hypothetical agreement
among rational participants: the principles of justice constraining the
state’s lawmaking activities are, on his view, those that would be chosen
by rational persons in an “original position.”38

36.
37.
38.

JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS 5 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
Id. at 6.
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 15–19 (rev. ed. 1999).
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The crucial idea of the original position is defined by three elements of
normative theoretical importance. First, persons in the original position
must be free and equal so as to preclude any unfair bargaining advantages
among the parties. As Rawls points out, “[I]f it is to be a valid agreement
from the point of view of political justice[,] . . . these conditions must
situate free and equal persons fairly and must not permit some to have
unfair bargaining advantages over others.”39
Second, persons in the original position are assumed to be concerned
only to maximize their own interests, and are not assumed to take an
interest in the welfare of other persons.40 The reason for this is that the
most that can be assumed about the motivations of any human being is
that she is motivated by her own prudential interests. While many human
beings are motivated by altruistic considerations, not everyone is. To
ensure that the principles chosen by persons in the original position are
universally acceptable, Rawls defines the original position in such a way
that the only psychological assumptions on which it depends are true of
every human being.
Third, and most importantly, persons in the original position are
shielded from information about their own contingent abilities and
circumstances by the so-called veil of ignorance.41 Persons behind the
veil of ignorance do not know, for example, how smart, athletic, physically
attractive, socially adept, wealthy, or healthy they are. As Rawls describes
this feature of the original position:
[N]o one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does
he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his
intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his conception
of the good, the particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the special
features of his psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or
pessimism. More than this, I assume that the parties do not know the particular
circumstances of their own society. That is, they do not know its economic or
political situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has been able to
achieve. The persons in the original position have no information as to which
generation they belong.42

A person in the original position, then, knows nothing about the abilities
and properties that distinguish her from other people. In effect, such a
person knows no more about herself than she does about any other
person; what knowledge she has about herself is limited to knowledge of
those properties that she shares with every other person.

39.
40.
41.
42.
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There are two points worth making about the original position. First,
it should be clear that the original position in Rawls’s theory does the
work of the state of nature in the classical social contact theories. The
veil of ignorance forces a person to make a choice; and it should be clear
that one of the relevant factors in making the choice will be to avoid
some of the extreme unpleasantness associated with the state of nature.
Second, the point of the veil of ignorance is to seal off information that
is irrelevant as far as justice is concerned.43 Although the principles of
justice are chosen by rational agents concerned only to advance their
own interests, they must make their choices only on the basis of information
that is morally relevant. Information about a person’s intellectual abilities is
morally irrelevant because those abilities depend largely on circumstances
over which she has little control: who her parents are, where she was
born, and how much education she has are largely matters of luck.
While such fortuitous circumstances are, of course, relevant with respect
to one’s prudential deliberations, they are irrelevant with respect to
one’s moral deliberations—and the choice of principles of justice is
ultimately a moral choice. Accordingly, persons in the original position
must choose principles that will advance their interests no matter what
abilities and propensities they turn out to have.
The imposition of the veil of ignorance prevents persons in the
original position from adopting an interest-maximizing principle for
pursuing their prudential interests. In conditions of full information,
a rationally self-interested agent can pursue a strategy that aims at
maximizing her own utility. In particular, such an agent can assess the
expected value of each act A by calculating the differential between the
expected benefit of A—that is, the magnitude of the benefit associated
43. As Rawls puts this important point:
[I]t seems reasonable and generally acceptable that no one should be advantaged or
disadvantaged by natural fortune or social circumstances in the choice of
principles. It also seems widely agreed that it should be impossible to tailor
principles to the circumstances of one’s own case. We should insure further that
particular inclinations and aspirations, and persons’ conceptions of their good
do not affect the principles adopted. The aim is to rule out those principles that
it would be rational to propose for acceptance, however little the chance of
success, only if one knew certain things that are irrelevant from the standpoint
of justice. For example, if a man knew that he was wealthy, he might find it
rational to advance the principle that various taxes for welfare measures be
counted unjust; if he knew that he was poor, he would most likely propose the
contrary principle.
Id. at 16–17.
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with A multiplied by its probability, and the expected cost of A—that is,
the magnitude of the cost associated with A multiplied by its probability,
and select the act with the highest expected value.44 By selecting the act
with the highest expected value, the agent optimizes her prospects for
maximizing her own utility.
In conditions of highly restricted information, however, rationally selfinterested agents must adopt a more conservative “maximin” strategy and
choose behaviors that are minimally necessary to protect themselves against
highly undesirable outcomes. As Rawls describes it, the maximin strategy
“tells us to identify the worst outcome of each available alternative and then
to adopt the alternative whose worst outcome is better than the worst
outcomes of all the other alternatives.”45 The maximin rule, unlike the
ordinary prudential strategy of maximizing expected value, takes only
into account the relative magnitude of the worst possible outcomes; it
does not take into account any information that assesses the comparative
probabilities of the various options because such information is not
available. In effect, then, rationally self-interested agents deploy the
maximin strategy as a means for avoiding the most unacceptable of
undesirable outcomes.
While some authors argue that the maximin strategy is not the only
rational strategy applicable in situations of high risk and uncertainty,46 it
should be clear that something very like the maximin strategy is rationally
deployed in such situations. A somewhat perverse example is helpful in
illustrating the point. From the standpoint of prudential rationality
alone,47 it is rational for someone with full information to play the most
dangerous games if the prize is large enough and the odds of losing are
remote enough. Whether it is prudentially rational, for example, to play
44. While agents do not typically ground their behaviors in explicit mathematical
calculations of probability, this is true for a variety of reasons that do not call the general
principle into question. First, in most instances, the relevant probabilities are known to
be one. For example, the probability of the only material cost of a candy bar—its
price—is one. Second, in circumstances in which the material probabilities are not
known to be one, the agent has only a rough feel for the relevant values. In such
situations, the role that explicit calculations normally play is played by a rough intuitive
process of weighing the outcomes.
45. RAWLS, supra note 36, at 97.
46. See, e.g., John C. Harsanyi, Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for
Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’s Theory, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 594, 598 (1975)
(reviewing RAWLS, supra note 38).
47. The standpoint of prudential rationality seeks nothing more than the maximization
of one’s own interests. While it is probably true that a purely prudential standpoint is
rarely appropriate, it is crucial to realize here that moral considerations are not relevant
with respect to making purely prudential decisions. Accordingly, the following example
brackets any considerations of morality, which would function to deter the agent from
playing the game. The only issue in deciding whether or not to play is whether doing so
maximally conduces to one’s self-interest.
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a game of Russian roulette with one bullet depends on the amount of the
prize and on the number of empty chambers in the gun. While it would
clearly be irrational to play if I know the prize is $1 and there is only one
empty chamber in the gun, it is clearly rational to play if I know the
prize is $100 million and there are six billion empty chambers;48 one
incurs a substantially greater risk of death every time one gets into
an automobile. In these cases, there is sufficient information to adopt an
interest-maximizing strategy that will sometimes dictate playing the game.
However, a more conservative maximin strategy is appropriate from the
standpoint of prudential rationality if I lack information about some of the
salient probabilities. For example, if I am not told how many empty
chambers there are in the gun, it is clearly rational to adopt a maximin
strategy that requires me to decline the game as a means of avoiding the
worst of undesirable outcomes.
Although the motivation for the veil of ignorance is largely moral, its
effect on the deliberations of agents in the original position is prudential
in character. Since the veil of ignorance denies people any information
about themselves that would tell them how likely they are to win or lose
in society, they must adopt a more conservative prudential strategy for
selecting the principles of justice than the interest-maximizing strategy
that is available in conditions of full information. They must, as a matter
of prudential rationality, choose those principles that are minimally necessary
to enable them to avoid the very worst outcomes. Since a maximin strategy
will enable them to do this, it is rationally deployed by agents in the
original position.
Rawls believes that a person in the original position will avoid the
very worst outcomes by choosing a principle that affords her maximum
liberty compatible with everyone else’s having comparable liberty and a
principle that assures that economic inequalities will conduce to her
benefit no matter where she winds up in society. According to the Liberty
Principle, “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
scheme of basic liberty compatible with a similar scheme of liberty for

48. This is subject to one qualification: if one believes that God exists and
punishes suicide with eternal and infinite suffering in hell, then the expected cost of the
game is infinite no matter how small the probability of losing. Since a finite expected
benefit is infinitesimally small relative to an infinite expected cost, it is irrational to play
the game on such theistic assumptions no matter how big the prize and how small the
probabilities of losing.
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others.”49 According to the Difference Principle, “social and economic
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected
to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices
open to all.”50 The person in the original position thus uses a maximin
strategy to enable her to avoid catastrophic situations in which her freedom
is denied or in which economic inequalities are permitted at her expense.
Here it is essential to consider some of the catastrophic situations that
the two principles of justice are chosen to avoid. The Liberty Principle,
which allows the maximum freedom to each compatible with similar
freedom for all, takes directly into account the consequences to physical
security of allowing people to do whatever they feel like doing. Utterly
unrestricted freedom is likely to lead people to resolve conflicts of
interests by violent behaviors—violence being an obvious threat to physical
security. The Difference Principle seeks to protect people from the effects
of life-threatening poverty when there are more than enough resources to
satisfy everyone’s basic needs, which is likely to result in violent conflicts.
The concern here is to avoid the catastrophic consequences associated with
debilitating illness, injury, or disability that prevent a person from
providing for her own needs. These are clearly provisions and concerns
that are intended to protect people from threats to life and from threats of
grievous bodily injury or debilitating disease and disability, which fall within,
if not the province of, physical security—something closely related.
It should be noted that nothing in these principles necessarily protects
any of the privacy interests that are typically protected by privacy rights.
Of course, in some cases, one might argue that protection of privacy is
necessary to ensure the full exercise of liberty rights, but these are two
different issues that are only contingently related; after all, the value of
privacy is not one accepted universally among cultures, and what is
considered private varies from culture to culture depending on other
contingent features that vary with culture. As was the case with the classical
theories, the right to, or moral interest in, privacy is not absolute and
must clearly sometimes yield to protection of physical security.
Rawls’s theory is sometimes treated as though one must test the
legitimacy of every proposed law by subjecting it to analysis from the
original position—something I doubt to be correct; but if this is the
correct interpretation, no practically rational self-interested agent would
choose a principle making the interest in privacy absolute.
The following is an easy way to see this: suppose we were considering
a law that made it possible for the state to combat terrorism by obtaining
the library records of patrons meeting a certain description without
49.
50.
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disclosing to patrons that their records have been disclosed. What would
someone in the original position say about this? It depends on how
much more we assume about its efficacy. If, for example, the law would
save one hundred thousand lives while slightly changing the reading
habits of just one person, it would be irrational not to accept the act.
However, if the act would prevent just one broken arm while severely
changing the reading habits of millions of people, then it would probably
be irrational to accept the act. From the original position, the act’s
legitimacy turns largely on the effects it will have on both security and
speech—issues that are empirical in character. Because we do not know
from the original position exactly what the facts are with respect to the
relevant numbers, we will, in adopting the maximin perspective, seek to
choose the rule with the most acceptable of the worst outcomes. In other
words, we will choose to allow the state to combat terrorism this way
because, from a position of highly limited information, the worst possible
outcome of adopting the rule is better than the worst possible outcome of
not adopting the rule: changing the reading habits of millions without
saving any lives is preferable to the number of lives that might be lost in
a worst-case scenario if the rule is not adopted.
From our current vantage point in combating terrorism, of course, this
sort of provision, which mirrors one in the USA PATRIOT Act,51 is
clearly not justifiably adopted. The problem is that, given our particular
experience with terrorists, we have enough information to be justified in
believing that a rule like this is not likely to achieve its purposes since
we have good reason to believe terrorists are not likely to seek out
information in a way easily traced to them. The issue, however, is what
would we say when we lack sufficient information to estimate the expected
costs and benefits of such a provision. Because we have adopted something
like a maximin perspective from this position, we would adopt a presumption
in favor of what we rationally take to be the most important value from a
self-interested perspective. From the standpoint of self-interest, most
people will share the intuition that security is more important than
privacy and make a presumption in favor of the act given its purpose.
Accordingly, in the absence of any information that would enable us
to predict the efficacy of such a restriction on privacy, the worst-case
scenario that the maximin strategy forces us to reject is being killed by
terrorists. The worst-case scenario with respect to privacy is that the
51.

See 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (Supp. IV 2004).
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state learns we are reading something that is really embarrassing. On the
assumption that we cannot estimate the probabilities from the original
position, we choose what seems to us from a position of much greater
information one of the most knuckleheaded provisions of the PATRIOT
Act.
In closing this subpart, it is worth noting one conspicuous difference
between classical social contract theories and Rawls’s contract theory.
The former relies on the idea that people actually consent to the social
contract that establishes the state authority, whereas the latter relies on
the weaker idea that people in the original position would consent to the
two principles of justice if they were in a position that they are clearly
not in. Otherwise put, the classical theories rely on actual consent,
whereas Rawls relies on hypothetical consent. Something like this,
as we will see, will turn out to be true of Robert Nozick’s version of
contract theory.
B. Robert Nozick’s Deontological Libertarianism
Classical social contract theories of legitimacy begin with the mythical
state of nature—a presocietal state that is the alternative to life in society
under a central lawmaking authority. The state of nature, as we have seen,
offers none of the benefits of society: no technology, no art, no communion
with other people, and no family. Because life in the state of nature is a
“Warre of everyone against everyone”52 and is “nasty, brutish, and short,”53
classical social contract theories infer that people either explicitly or
impliedly consent to the authority of the state as a means of avoiding
such a bad life. Since any social arrangement, and hence any state, is
preferable to the state of nature, the state can be presumed legitimate as
something to which citizens actually or impliedly promise obedience.
Nozick believes there are at least two problems with this strategy.
First, it assumes that people would always behave very badly towards
one another. Indeed, this comes close to assuming that people are inherently
violent and bad. If the intrinsic goodness of people cannot confidently
be assumed, neither can the intrinsic badness of people. Second, it assumes
that there could not be a state that is worse than the state of nature. As
Nozick points out, there are some possible states so bad, so oppressive,
that even the state of nature would win. I would rather live in the state
of nature than be subject to state-sponsored torture.
Accordingly, Nozick begins from a more modest assumption. He
focuses on what he thinks is the best anarchic alternative to the state. In
52.
53.
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particular, he focuses upon a presocial situation in which people generally,
though not always, satisfy moral constraints, and generally, though not
always, act as they ought. In such an anarchic situation, people do not
always behave well, but they usually do. According to Nozick:
If one could show that the state would be superior even to this most favored
situation of anarchy, the best that realistically can be hoped for, or would arise
by a process involving no morally impermissible steps, or would be an
improvement if it arose, this would provide a rationale for the state’s existence;
it would justify the state.54

In arguing for his libertarian theory of legitimacy, Nozick starts from
certain Lockean assumptions about the state of nature and natural rights
and by a series of steps that he takes to be inevitable, each one permissible
under morality, shows that every rational person starting from the best
possible anarchic situation would move to a situation with a minimal
state—a minimal state being one that limits its coercive functions to
protection of the moral rights to life, liberty, and property.
It is important to realize that there are two major streams to the
analysis—and both play a crucial role in justifying the general conclusion
that the minimal state is morally legitimate. The first is, of course, that
each transition from anarchic existence to the minimal state is morally
permissible. The second is that each transition is inevitable given certain
basic facts about human well-being and psychology. Although it may
appear less important, the second step is vital to the success of the argument.
Nozick’s argument will justify only those states that arise out of such a
series of transitions. Nozick takes care of this problem by arguing that
each step in the series is inevitable, given certain basic facts about
human beings. Because there is, in effect, no other way to get from the
anarchic state of nature to the minimal state, the minimal state can be
presumed legitimate no matter where it occurs. For this reason, Nozick
can validly draw the general conclusion that every minimal state is
morally legitimate.
Although Nozick regards the state of nature as more pleasant than
Hobbes and Locke did, he also realizes that life in the state of nature
remains both unpleasant and unstable; people may not always behave
badly, but they frequently do enough to make the state of nature a
condition people want to escape—and this, as a matter of practical rationality,
requires some sort of response. Initially, people deal with this difficulty
54.

ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 5 (1974).
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by forming groups devoted to the mutual protection of all their members, a
response that is morally permissible under the natural law, since people
have a right to form consensual associations, and also have the right to
defend themselves and other persons.
This will alleviate some of the difficulties associated with defending
oneself, but Nozick argues such associations will have to be refined in
certain ways. First, everyone will always be “on call,” which involves
tremendous inconvenience. Second, it is not clear how protective associations
will resolve conflicts between their members. Third, it is not clear how
to resolve disputes between members and nonmembers.
Most importantly, problems are likely to arise as a number of protective
associations arise in the same region and members of different protective
associations begin to have conflicts. While such problems are not likely
to become serious when both associations agree on the disposition of the
case, they can become serious when they disagree. If one association wants
to punish the member of another association that wants to protect its
member, the two associations are likely to wage battles. The eventual result
of such battles will be that one protective association—a dominant
protective association that will become a justified minimal state—will
achieve ascendancy in the region, because opponents are either absorbed
after defeat or move away. As Nozick describes the situation:
In each of those cases, almost all the persons in a geographical area are under
some common system that judges between their competing claims and enforces
their rights. Out of anarchy, pressed by spontaneous groupings, mutual-protection
associations, divisions of labor, market pressures, economies of scale, and
rational self-interest there arises something very much resembling a minimal
state or a group of geographically distinct minimal states.55

Whether the minimal state is morally legitimate, on Nozick’s view, will
depend in part on whether or not it attempts in good faith to stay within
the limits of the Lockean laws of nature. If it systematically and intentionally
aggresses against the natural rights of others, then it will not be
legitimate; it will be an “outlaw” association. If, however, it makes it a
point to respect the natural rights of persons and minimizes violations, it
will be legitimate to that extent.
As is true of classical social contract theory, the primary motivation
for every rational being to move from a presocial state of nature to a
society with a central authority is to achieve more security than is
otherwise possible—even though Nozick’s conception of the state of
nature is somewhat more benign than that of the classical theories.
Moreover, the minimal state is subject to the constraints of the Lockean
conception of morality, which takes the primary purpose of the state to
55.
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protect property—presumably because property is necessary to the
survival of each person and is hence the most likely motivation for
persons to threaten the security—and hence rights to life of others. To
prevent such conflicts, the state must be especially concerned with
protecting the right to property, and hence, derivatively, the right to life.
Although it is true that some privacy interests either fall within the
ambit of liberty interests or are prerequisites for the meaningful exercise
of liberty requirements—I am less likely to freely express my right to
speech on the Internet if I feel that my movements and anonymity are
tracked and compromised—it is crucial to note that Nozick’s theory of
the legitimate minimal state, as is true of every other theory we have
considered, does not expressly name privacy as an interest or right that
the minimal state is morally required to protect as a precondition of its
legitimacy.
This suggests that, for Nozick’s theory as for each other theory we
have considered, security is the most important value. Although there is
no talk of a “right” to security, security provides the morally legitimate
motive for making the various transitions that move each rational person
from a presocial state of nature to life under a society with a coercive
and centralized state authority. This entails that security is the ultimate
value that the state is morally obligated to protect and that when legitimate
security interests directly conflict with legitimate privacy interests of
comparable importance, the former trump the latter. Thus, for Nozick,
as with every other theorist we have considered, if there is a privacy
right, it is far from being absolute.
IX. UTILITARIAN THEORIES OF STATE LEGITIMACY
According to utilitarianism, the moral value of any act is fully
determined by its effect on net aggregate utility among members of the
community.56 Utilitarian moral theories posit a particular state of affairs
as objectively good—the maximization of aggregate utility—and define
56. Utility is usually defined in subjective terms of happiness, pleasure, or satisfied
preferences. See WILLIAM L. REESE, DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION 601
(1980). This creates epistemic difficulties in evaluating acts under utilitarianism: how
does one go about measuring someone’s happiness and comparing it to someone else’s
happiness. Welfarist conceptions frequently take an objective conception of human
flourishing as the index for utility, easing the epistemic difficulties somewhat, but at the
expense of a new difficulty—namely, identifying the objective measures of well-being.
See 9 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 702–04 (Edward Craig ed., 1998).
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an act as morally right to the extent that it promotes this favored state of
affairs—to the extent that it promotes aggregate utility—and morally
wrong to the extent that it fails to promote this favored state of affairs.
Since an act’s effect on utility is an extrinsic feature of the act,57 utilitarian
theories presuppose that the moral quality of an act does not depend on
its intrinsic, or inherent, features, and hence that no act is inherently
good or inherently bad. Acts are good or bad only insofar as they conduce
or fail to conduce to the utility of members in the community.58
As a general moral theory, utilitarianism applies both to acts of
individuals and to acts of the state. Applied to the state, it implies that
the state’s lawmaking authority is constrained by a duty to enact laws
that maximally promote aggregate community utility. As political theorist
Henry Sidgwick puts the point:
[T]he true standard and criterion by which right legislation is to be distinguished
from wrong is conduciveness to the general “good” or “welfare.” And probably
the great majority of persons would agree to interpret the “good” or “welfare”
of the community to mean, in the last analysis, the happiness of the individual
human beings who compose the community; provided that we take into account
not only the human beings who are actually living but those who are to live
hereafter. . . . Accordingly, . . . the happiness of the persons affected [is] the
ultimate end and standard of right and wrong in determining the functions and
constitution of government.59

Utilitarian theories of legitimacy, then, assess acts of the state entirely in
terms of whether they sufficiently conduce to the favored state of
affairs—maximal promotion of utility among the citizenry. The state’s
sole obligation, on this view, is to act in ways that have the effect of
maximally promoting net utility among its citizens.60

57. An act can have radically different consequences depending on the circumstances
of its performance. For example, whether the act of giving a medication to someone
promotes utility depends on to whom the medication is given. Whereas giving a cancer
patient chemotherapy, which is highly toxic, can improve her utility, giving it to a
healthy person can worsen her utility by increasing the probability that she develops
certain kinds of cancer in the long term.
58. This distinguishes consequentialist theories like utilitarianism from deontological
theories, which assert that the moral quality of some acts is determined entirely by their
intrinsic features. On this view, for example, lying is intrinsically wrong—and hence
wrong regardless of whether it happens to promote community utility.
59. Henry Sidgwick, Utility and Government, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
35, 35 (George Sher & Baruch A. Brody eds., 1999).
60. John Stuart Mill argued that considerations of utility justified the general
principle that the state can legitimately prohibit only those acts that are harmful to others.
On Mill’s view, utility is most likely to be maximized in a society where people are free
to develop and act on their own conceptions of the good; people who are allowed to
pursue their own values and plans are more likely to develop the sorts of skills and
abilities that will make them useful to other people. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY
86–138 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859) [hereinafter
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It is commonly thought that utilitarian theories that evaluate acts in
terms of total utility are inconsistent with the idea that individuals have
any moral rights of the sort we commonly take for granted. There are two
related reasons for this. First, it is easy to come up with counterexamples
that seem to show that utilitarianism requires what we take to be the
violation of any right. For example, a doctor would be morally obligated
under utilitarianism to painlessly kill a healthy but otherwise irreversibly
depressed homeless person with no friends or family if necessary to
harvest his organs to save the lives of several persons who contribute
greatly to maximizing utility. Second, as we saw earlier, the infringement
of a right, as a conceptual matter and matter of substantive morality,
cannot be justified by the consequences to public utility of doing so;
similarly, Nozick speaks of side constraints as doing the same work.
Rights, on this common conception, “trump” consequences. The problem
with utilitarian “rights” is that, as the counterexamples show, any interest
we take to be covered by a right can be justifiably infringed if the
consequences of doing so are favorable enough. As far as moral rights
are concerned, utilitarianism seems inconsistent with there being any.
It is crucial to note, however, that the issue of whether the state should
recognize and protect legal rights is an analytically distinct issue from
the issue of whether there are any moral rights. It might be that any
failure on the part of the state to protect what we (mis)take—if act
utilitarianism is true—to be foundational moral rights would result in the
kind of social instability that is inconsistent with maximally promoting
social utility. If this turns out to be true, then the state will be obligated,
under a utilitarian theory of legitimacy, to provide legal protection of
rights to life, liberty, property, and presumably privacy—although these,
strictly speaking, will not qualify as “moral” rights.
Even so, it seems clear that privacy interests will generally receive
lesser protection than security interests under such a theory. If utility is
defined subjectively, then it seems clear that this will be the case; many
people in the former Soviet Union who are better off in terms of liberty,
and possibly even income, have expressed preferences to return to the
totalitarian regime precisely because they felt more secure under the
protection of a police force that seemed to be everywhere. This, of course,
is not an obviously irrational preference if the intuitions I described at
MILL, ON LIBERTY]. See J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Roger Crisp ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1998) (1861) for a general account of Mill’s utilitarianism.
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the beginning of this essay are correct. I would prefer physical security
over just about any other right—with the possible exception of a certain
affluent standard of living. Indeed, despite all the hysteria in the United
States about the violation of privacy rights by laws such as the USA
PATRIOT Act, most people seem to be as happy, on any subjective
measure, as always.
If, on the other hand, utility is defined objectively in terms of wellbeing, it seems clear that security is more important than privacy. It
seems very difficult to make the case that, as an objective matter, people
are better off in terms of well-being if they sacrifice security, other
things being equal, for privacy. While privacy interests seem important
in cultures like ours to well-being as an objective matter, it seems
absolutely clear that security from death or grievous bodily injury is
more important than privacy interests and will trump those interests in
the event of a direct conflict, as I have defined that idea. According to
utilitarian theories of state legitimacy, then, it is reasonable to conclude
that privacy interests or rights are not absolute.
Again, the claim is not that any increase in security, no matter how
small, is likely to offset any sacrifice in privacy, no matter how extensive.
Doubts about the efficacy of a law in protecting security at the expense
of privacy might have the effect of making people very unhappy even
when these doubts are incorrect. But, other things being equal, people
will regard the most important security interests they have as being
morally more important than the most important privacy interests they
have, suggesting that security is more important than privacy on a subjective
conception of utility; and, on an objective conception of flourishing and
well-being, that seems straightforwardly correct. Whether the utilitarian
standard is defined in terms of subjective conceptions of happiness or
pleasure, or whether it is defined in terms of objective conceptions of
well-being and flourishing, a utilitarian theory of legitimacy seems
clearly to afford more protection, other things being equal, to security
interests than to privacy interests. As I have put this idea elsewhere,
security trumps privacy.
X. COMMUTARIAN THEORIES OF STATE LEGITIMACY
A. Commutarian Theories Generally
There are a variety of different theories that fall within the rubric of
commutarian justifications of state authority, but all begin by challenging an
assumption, somewhat inaccurately attributed to all so-called liberal
theories of legitimacy: the most important legitimate concern of the state
is to protect individual rights and not to advance either (1) some notion
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of the common good grounded in the moral importance of community;
(2) a notion of the common good that is not simply aggregative of
individual goods; or (3) a conception of the self as necessarily social in
character. On these views, the values of protecting individual autonomy
and rights is the best, if not the only viable way, to promote something
viably characterized as a “common” or “public” good.
The commutarian positions range from descriptive claims grounded in
history, sociology, and psychology that largely express Aristotle’s view
of human beings as social animals rather than as atomistic centers of
individual autonomy and choice and the implications of this conception
for claims about human well-being and flourishing, to normative claims
about the moral importance of preserving community and social order
relative to the moral importance of encouraging autonomy by expanding
the range of individual choices available to each individual. Indeed,
some commutarian claims are fairly grounded in meta-ethical claims
about the inappropriateness of taking liberal assumptions about the
individual as applying across all social contexts and cultures. The
appropriateness of democracy, for example, for a society has to be
assessed against the cultural context and history of that society—a lesson
that has been painfully confirmed by our unfortunate experience in Iraq
where the attempt to forcefully replace Saddam Hussein with a
democratic regime reflecting our liberal values threatens to degenerate
into a civil war that is likely to consume that country for at least the next
fifty years,61 but should have been learned from our experience with

61. As is so characteristic of the white Western world’s attempt to remake the
world of darker peoples in its own image, the majority position in the United States is
now simply to get out of Iraq, without any concern for the damage that we have caused
by creating the conditions for a civil war that will tear Iraq apart, resulting in
perhaps tens of thousands of innocent deaths. The history of colonialism and rapid
decolonization reflects this blithe unconcern with our sense of moral responsibility: we
go in, assert dominion to take control of a nation’s resources; and then we bail out when
things get rough, arbitrarily drawing boundaries that are oblivious to existing hostilities
and tensions among social groups while simultaneously attempting to maintain control
over the country’s resources. Slavery provides another somewhat different example:
after years of one of history’s worst injustices, the United States finally set the slaves
free, but without providing them even one cent to compensate them for the profit they
produced for white slaveowners and a growing agrarian economy and without putting
them in a position to begin a meaningful and productive life as a U.S. citizen. Indeed,
the present value of the forced labor taken from slaves from 1620 to 1865 has been
estimated to be—depending on what reasonable rate of interest is chosen—$1 trillion to
$97 trillion. See, e.g., Joe R. Feagin, Documenting the Costs of Slavery, Segregation,
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colonizing, decolonizing, and finally enslaving developing nations with
loans tied to conditions that ultimately hurt those nations. These loans
usually do so by requiring the recipient nations to open vulnerable
markets to Western industries while Western nations continue to protect
vulnerable industries like agriculture against recipient nations, which are
in a favorable condition to compete only with those latter industries.
The result of such aid is that it winds up destroying the local competing
industries and exacerbating the very conditions of poverty the loans were
supposed to alleviate.
Even at this high level of generality, it is easy to see that a commutarian
agenda that values a common good independent of the aggregation of
individual goods, constituted by opportunities for satisfied autonomous
preferences, will entail the position that security, construed as a collective
notion like a social order in which serious crime and violence is
uncommon—rather than as an aggregation of individual rights to life,
property, et cetera—is a more important moral value, other things being
equal, than privacy. If preserving the social values associated with
community, or common good, is more important than individual rights,
then it follows that security, properly construed, is more important than
privacy in the sense that threats to security are more important from the
standpoint of morality and deserve more legal protection than “comparable”
threats to privacy, which is an interest that is unique to individuals and
which reflects the individualism of neoliberal traditions.
Again, this should not be thought to entail any sort of easy algorithm
for deciding how to deal with apparent conflicts between security or
privacy or any claim to the effect that any gain in security, no matter
how small, justifies any sacrifice of privacy, no matter how large; the
claim that security trumps privacy is compatible with a calculus of
weighing competing privacy and security interests that is extremely
complex and sometimes favors protecting privacy concerns over security
interests if the former are substantial enough, and the latter trivial
and Contemporary Racism: Why Reparations Are in Order for African Americans, 20
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 49 (2004).
At the upper end of the scale, this would require, if universal reparations were morally
required, a payout of more than $300,000 for each black man, woman, and child in this
country. Of course, there is no guarantee that such value would have all been
transmitted from one generation to the next, but I think it is clear that had slaves been
fairly remunerated, we would not have the development of a permanent underclass of
black citizens confined to terrible inner city neighborhoods.
I simply cannot resist saying what is just not said enough: the behavior of the white
Western world towards peoples of color has been, and continues to be, reprehensible.
The United States, to my knowledge, has not even been able to bring itself to apologize
for slavery—much less take effective measures to reduce the economic inequalities that
have been transmitted from one generation of black persons to the next from the time of
slavery!
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enough, or if there is simply not enough of a causal connection between
the restrictions on privacy and some meaningfully large gain in security.
The notion of security includes individual rights to life and physical and
financial security, but it is also a collective notion that includes the idea
that social order and the preservation of community is a value protected
by security that is independent and not merely aggregative of individual
security rights—a component, that is, of a common good not constituted
by the aggregation of individual goods of all persons in the social group.
If this notion of a common good applies to all societies—and methodological
commutarians need not take this position insofar as they merely reject
the universal application of the liberal conception of self and value—
then it follows that security will, as I vaguely put it, trump privacy, and
that privacy is not an absolute value because informational privacy is an
individual interest, whereas security is an interest expressive of the
common good.
B. Moderate Commutarianism, Security, and Privacy
Nevertheless, there are a variety of different commutarian theories,
and one of the most nuanced and subtle is Amitai Etzioni’s version of
commutarianism. Unlike other theorists who characterize themselves as
commutarian, Etzioni does not absolutely privilege the common good
over individual goods or individual choice. On Etzioni’s view, the
commutarian view recognizes that individual choice or autonomy and
social order exist in a symbiotic relationship. Too much freedom of
choice, as arguably has happened in societies like the United States, and
social order is threatened; too much social order, as arguably occurs in
totalitarian societies like the former U.S.S.R., and individual autonomy
is threatened. As Etzioni deftly puts the point:
The commutarian paradigm, at least as advanced here, recognizes the need to
nourish social attachments as part of the effort to maintain social order while
ensuring that such attachments will not suppress all autonomous expressions.
That is, a good society does not favor the social good over individual choices or
vice versa; it favors societal formulations that serve the two dual social virtues
[of collective order and individual rights] in careful equilibrium.62

Etzioni, then, differs from liberals who take the position that individuals
are atomistic entities with individual autonomy being the most important
62. AMITAI ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE: COMMUNITY
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 27 (1996).
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moral notion, and from social conservatives, and more extreme commutarians,
who take the position that individual identity is constructed, in part, by
the network of social relationships in which the individual stands and
that social order is the most important balance. For Etzioni, meaningful
individual autonomy and meaningful social order cannot be considered
apart from one another. They must be weighed against each other to find
the proper balance; Etzioni’s view is thus what I will call the “moderate”
version of commutarianism, one that attempts to strike the proper
balance between individual autonomy and social order.
Etzioni attempts to articulate principles that indicate when the proper
balance of privacy and social order is maintained—and it should be
noted that these principles purport to address some of the epistemological
principles I have indicated cannot be addressed in this essay. First, as he
puts it, “a well-balanced, commutanitarian society will take steps to limit
privacy only if it faces a well-documented and macroscopic threat to the
common good, not a merely a hypothetical danger.”63 He argues, for
example, that HIV poses a well-documented and macroscopic threat to
millions of lives that can be reduced by testing infants for HIV.64
Second, officials should explore the possibility of effectively minimizing
the threat to the common good without restricting privacy; if the risk can
be minimized by less intrusive means, it should be done so. Third,
restrictions to privacy for the purpose of promoting the common good
should be as minimally intrusive as possible. Finally, officials should
take steps to minimize undesirable side effects of restrictions on privacy.
These are surely sensible principles, but they do not fully address the
difficult epistemological questions I described above. Distinguishing
well-documented and macroscopic threats to the common good from
merely hypothetical threats is easy at the margins, but prohibitively
difficult with respect to certain measures of, say, the USA PATRIOT
Act, which is intended to protect against terrorism. Some probabilities
are simply obvious, but those that are not resist accurate calculation
because we lack an appropriate theory or algorithm for calculating them;
much of the work here will be guesswork, and hence, highly speculative.
Second, it will frequently not be clear whether a particular restriction on
privacy will have the desired effect on promoting the social good or
whether alternative restrictions will be equally effective. But, more
importantly, none of these principles tells us how to weigh the privacy
interests of one possibly larger set of individuals against the security
interests of a smaller set, or how to determine when a threat to social
order is comparable to a threat to privacy relative to their respective
63.
64.
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hierarchies. Etzioni’s principles are, of course, useful in helping us to
make such decisions, but the major epistemological issues that would
have to be resolved to comprehensively address all the issues remain
without solution.
It is important to note that Etzioni sometimes talks in terms of
balancing individual rights with the “common good” and sometimes in
terms of balancing them with the need for “social order.” These are two
different notions that are themselves different from the notion of security.
The common good is the weakest of the notions in the sense that it
encompasses the broadest range of considerations. For example, the
common good is surely promoted by the existence of libraries and
museums where people can read books and view art free of charge, but it
is not clear that these institutions promote social order—much less
security. The notion of social order connotes a certain kind of functioning
and cooperation among individuals that libraries and museums might,
but need not, promote. Institutional protections of contract rights, in
contrast, promote social order—and hence also the common good—by
providing a foundation for cooperative economic behavior to take place;
civil laws protecting contracts enable people to buy and sell goods and
services in an orderly way that is less likely to lead to breaches that
might cause wholesale breakdowns in the kind of economic activity that
enables societies to grow their stock of economic assets.
The notion of security is somewhat narrower than the notion of social
order. Breakdowns in social order need not be so severe as to threaten a
society’s collective security. Increasing disagreement on important moral
issues diminishes social order by making political discourse less civil
and less likely to resolve these disputes, as conversations on talk radio
shows at both ends of the political spectrum amply demonstrate. But
those disagreements need not rise to the level of something that threatens
the kinds of interests in well-being implicated by the notion of security.
A citywide riot involves both a breakdown in social order and a threat to
security; a politically divided citizenry might diminish orderly functioning
in various social domains, but it does not necessarily involve a threat to
security. Threats to security necessarily implicate the social order, as a
conceptual matter, but they involve the gravest threats.
The point here is that the idea that privacy and the common good or
social order must be balanced does not involve denying the thesis of this
essay—namely that, other things being equal, security trumps privacy.
It might be true that social order might sometimes yield to privacy, but
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the threats to the social order that rise to the level of threats to security
always win in conflicts with privacy interests that are of comparable
importance relative to the spectrum of privacy interests. When we are
talking about saving innocent human lives, the most private facts about
innocent persons are just not that important; if it is true—and this is not
true as often as conservative politicians believe—that disclosure of such
facts will save those lives, then it seems clearly justified to infringe
privacy interests—as long as people are protected from any adverse
consequences of those disclosures.
In any event, it is clear that even on Etzioni’s more moderate conception
of commutarianism, privacy interests are not absolute and do not necessarily
trump other interests. Privacy must sometimes, even on the narrowest
interpretation, yield to social order or the common good. But once the
relationship between the concepts of security, social order, and common
good are made clear, it seems reasonable to think that threats to security
will win in conflicts with threats to privacy interests that are of relatively
comparable importance. Our interests in those matters essential to physical
survival and well-being, which are the subjects of our security interests,
seem to be presumptively more important, as a general matter, than our
interests in informational privacy. Informational privacy might sometimes
defeat considerations that promote the common good or social order, but
not considerations that promote or protect what is absolutely essential to
physical survival and well-being.
XI. SCANLON’S “CONTRACTUALISM”
Thomas Scanlon is famous for developing an influential objectivist
theory of morality that is fully grounded in the claim that morality
provides reasons for action—and not in any sort of ontological account
that attempts to identify real moral properties in the world. Scanlon is
thus a moral objectivist—that is, some moral principles are true independently
of what any person, group of persons, or culture believe, accept, or
practice, and not in virtue of custom or convention—but not a moral
realist—that is, there are real moral properties out there forming part of
the fabric of the universe that are the mind-independent truth-makers of
moral principles.
As is readily evident, moral realism implies moral objectivism, but if
Scanlon is correct, moral objectivism does not imply moral realism. As
Scanlon puts this important point:
If we could characterize the method of reasoning through which we arrive at
judgments of right and wrong, . . . [n]o interesting question would remain about
the ontology of morals . . . .
This is because, in contrast to everyday empirical judgments, scientific claims,
and religious beliefs that involve claims about the origin and control of the
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universe, the point of judgments of right and wrong is not to make claims about
what the spatiotemporal world is like. The point of such judgments is, rather, a
practical one: they make claims about what we have reason to do. Metaphysical
questions about the subject matter of judgments of right and wrong are important
only if answers to them are required in order to show how these judgments can
have this practical significance. It may be said that we need a metaphysical
characterization of the subject matter of morality in order to establish that moral
judgments are about something “real,” but it is worth asking what kind of reality
is at issue and why it is something we should be worried about.65

Scanlon takes the reason-giving force of moral judgments as basic—that
is, as not being in need of theoretical explication—and as being
fundamental to their objective quality, and not implying the existence of
any sort of moral properties out there in the world picked out by the
terms “right” and “wrong.” The terms “right” and “wrong” simply indicate
that we have a reason of a certain sort to perform, or refrain from
performing certain actions.
Scanlon explains the special reason-giving force of moral judgments
in terms of justifying acts in a manner that no person could reasonably
reject. On this view, an act is wrong “if its performance under the
circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the
general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a
basis for informed, unforced general agreement.”66 Although termed
“contractualist,” the claim here is not that there is such agreement or
even that all rational persons would come to agree on certain principles;
rather the claim is that people who are concerned to adopt principles
would converge on principles that no one who shares certain cultural
assumptions could reasonably reject. While there is no claim that everyone
is concerned to adopt such principles—there are, of course, sociopaths
who seem utterly unconcerned with that matter—he believes that someone
who is not concerned to adopt principles governing the behavior of the
relevant group is deficient in some sense analogous to the way in which
someone who cares nothing about art is deficient.
It is important to note here that the notion of reasonableness is
different from the notion of rationality, and that the claim is not the
Kantian claim that an act is wrong if it violates principles that no rational
person can reject as defining an end in itself. In contrast, Kant sought to
derive moral principles from our nature as rational beings, holding that
there are some ends, defined by “categorical imperatives,” that every
65.
66.

T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 2 (1998).
Id. at 153.
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rational being has in virtue of being rational regardless of her wants,
desires, emotions, preferences, beliefs, or practices. These ends are defined
by moral rules that are categorical in the sense that they apply to persons
regardless of such contingent mental states.67 For Kant, to act wrongly is
for the agent to act irrationally in the narrow sense of acting inconsistently
with her own ends, although these ends need not be consciously
embraced by the agent because they are her ends in virtue of being
rational, and not in virtue of any desires she has or choices she makes.
Scanlon’s claim is rather that an act is wrong if it violates a principle
that no person with the right kind of motivations could reasonably reject.
The notion of reasonableness is, itself, a moral notion, reflecting a prior
commitment to adopting standards of right and wrong—and possibly
presupposing some very general standards governing reasonableness:
When we say, in the course of an attempt to reach some collective decision, that
a person is being unreasonable, what we often mean is that he or she is refusing
to take other people’s interests into account. What we are claiming is that there
is reason to take these interests into account given the supposed aim of reaching
agreement or finding a course of action that everyone will be happy with.68

To reject something unreasonably seems to indicate a moral fault—
something akin to unfairness: you are asking me to participate in agreeing to
certain rules governing our behavior towards others, but you are not
taking my interests into account. However, as Scanlon points out, it
does not necessarily involve irrationality or incoherence: “the fault
involved in failing to be moved by moral requirements does not seem to
be a form of incoherence.”69
Scanlon gives a number of examples of rules he believes could not be
reasonably rejected by people motivated to reach an agreement on rules
regulating the behavior of community members towards others in the
community, and it would be instructive to consider one of them to see
how this theory applies with respect to personal interests that fall within
the rubric of security. Scanlon goes into much more detail than is appropriate
or needed for our purposes, but it is worth noting what he has to say
about a moral principle manipulating persons to do things by getting
them to believe that something will be done that benefits them if they do
the thing that is being induced by manipulation. Scanlon believes that
we could not reasonably reject the following principle:

67. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK
(Allen W. Wood ed. & trans., 2002).
68. SCANLON, supra note 65, at 33.
69. Id. at 151.
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Principle M: In the absence of special justification, it is not permissible for one
person, A, in order to get another person, B, to do some act, X (which A wants
B to do and which B is morally free to do or not do but would otherwise not
do), to lead B to expect that if he or she does X then A will do Y (which B
wants but believes that A will otherwise not do), when in fact A has no intention
of doing Y if B does X, and A can reasonably foresee that B will suffer
significant loss if he or she does X and A does not reciprocate by doing Y.70

This principle protects persons from being induced by false expectations to
do things they are not obligated to do, and would not otherwise do, but
for the inducement of the false expectation.
Scanlon, reasonably enough, argues that anyone who is motivated to
agree upon a rule that governs the behavior of persons in a given community
could not reasonably reject this principle:
I take this to be a valid moral principle. Considering the matter from the point
of view of potential victims of manipulation, there is a strong generic reason to
want to be able to direct one’s efforts and resources toward aims one has chosen
and not to have one’s planning co-opted in the way Principle M forbids whenever
this suits someone else’s purposes. So it would be reasonable to reject a
principle offering any less protection against manipulation. On the other side,
the perfectly general generic reason for wanting to be able to manipulate others
whenever it would be convenient to do so is not strong enough to make it
unreasonable to insist on the protection that M provides.71

Here it is important to note that the reasons against adoption of M are
purely self-interested and will not be strong enough to outweigh the
other reasons for M in persons who are motivated to reach agreement on
rules governing the behavior of the group for the purposes of assigning
praise, blame, reward, and punishment—which are, of course, moral
motivations to begin with.
It is easy to see how one would arrive through a contractualist analysis
at moral principles protecting life, physical safety and health, liberty,
property, and information privacy. Given the obvious significance of our
vulnerability to suffer injuries to these interests and the limited import of
self-interested reasons in persons properly motivated to reach agreement, it
would be unreasonable to reject not only principles protecting these
interests, but also to reject principles that rank these principles according
to the personal importance of the interests they protect. Clearly, for
example, it would be unreasonable to accept a principle that sacrifices
the life of an innocent person in order to protect the information privacy
70.
71.

Id. at 298.
Id. at 298–99.
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of another innocent person—no matter how intimate or embarrassing
that piece of personal information might be. Anyone properly motivated
would make the call based on his own obvious assessment that his life
means more to him than the privacy of any particular piece of information,
and adopt an impersonal point of view that recognizes the comparative
importance to others of those same interests.
Similar things can be said about the interests in physical safety and
health. No reasonable person concerned to reach agreement on moral
rules could reasonably reject a norm that ranks protection against serious
threats to personal health and safety as outweighing comparable threats
to information privacy. My health and safety are more important to me
than any embarrassing information that might be disclosed about me,
and I may fairly presume that other persons will make the same valuations.
Whatever idiosyncratic self-interest I might have in infringing someone’s
physical safety and health to protect my personal privacy, my special
concern in my own interests could not justify reasonably rejecting a
principle that protects everyone’s physical safety and health, in part,
because I would never accept any less protection of my own physical
safety and health—and my interest in infringing such interests of other
people is clearly unreasonable if I am antecedently concerned to reach
agreement on some sort of principle regarding the protection of such
interests.
The same is obviously true of the collective goods that make up
collective security. My individual security, construed to include my interests
in life, safety, health, and general well-being, are seriously threatened by
threats to the collective security. A riot or a war being waged in my
neighborhood poses serious risks to me that I would not accept for the
sake of information privacy and thus I could not reasonably reject a
principle that sacrifices comparable interests in my information privacy
to protect the collective security—regardless of the extent to which my
own individual security is threatened. A reasonable person motivated to
reach agreement on such principles could not fail to realize that social
insecurity that threatens her individual security interests outweighs,
other things being equal, her interests in information privacy and would
hence not be in position to reasonably reject principles that protect
security over comparable threats to information privacy.
Scanlon’s theory is not explicitly concerned with political morality,
but its application to moral questions about what the state ought and
ought not do is quite natural given that Scanlon views his theory as
being the foundation for all moral duties and rights. If contractualism is
the foundation for all moral principles, then it is the foundation not only
for moral principles governing individuals, but also for moral principles
governing the behavior of collective social groups, like state agencies.
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Therefore, it governs what states may do by way of enacting laws that
protect the various security and privacy interests, as well as norms intended
to resolve conflicts that arise among these interests. If Scanlon’s theory
is correct, it seems clear that, other things being equal, security trumps
privacy when there are competing threats to commensurable values of
security and privacy.
XII. NORMATIVE THEORIES OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Normative theories of the criminal and civil law attempt to state the
conditions under which particular criminal and civil laws are morally
legitimate in the sense that they may coercively restrict freedom; every
law coercively restricts freedom to the extent that it is ultimately backed
by the police power of the state either in the form of punishment or in
the form of the contempt sanction, which empowers a court to incarcerate a
party to a lawsuit until she complies with a court order—such as might
occur in a civil suit for damages.
These theories tend to assume that the content of the particular area of
law is morally legitimate and attempt to explain that fact in terms of a
moral principle that laws in that area satisfy more often than not. For
example, normative theories of the criminal law frequently focus on
principles that indicate the law may prohibit behaviors that cause unjustified
harm to others and even, in some cases, to oneself. Thus, for example,
laws prohibiting intentional killing of others are justified in virtue of
satisfying something like Mill’s Harm Principle—though Mill limited
his formulation of the Harm Principle to laws that prevent harm to
others.72 On this view, behaviors that cause significant, unjustified harm
can be criminalized, which means that those behaviors can be punished
by fines, incarceration, and possibly execution.73
Theories that justify the state’s authority in areas of civil law tend to
be more specific, focusing on the content of a particular substantive area
of law—rather than on a general capacity of the state to enact civil
regulations on behavior. For example, Charles Fried justifies the
content of contract law by showing it coheres, for the most part, to
72. MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 60, at 80–81.
73. For a helpful summary of the various normative theories of punishment, see
Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880
(1991).
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uncontroversial moral principles governing promises.74 Jules Coleman
justifies the content of tort law by showing it embodies a legitimate
conception of corrective justice.75 Robert Nozick argues that property
law is justified to the extent it coheres with moral principles that define a
natural right to property, which includes the authority to freely alienate
one’s interest in property by a variety of morally effective consensual
mechanisms.76
While there are a number of theories attempting to describe the conditions
of procedural legitimacy, they have largely focused on the criminal
context. For example, these theories focus on the procedural rights that
a criminal defendant should have, which include, but are not limited to, a
right to a fair trial, a right to competent representation, a right to appeal,
and a right to be acquitted if the evidence does not meet the “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard. Normative theories of criminal procedure
attempt to describe the principles that determine whether a trial is “fair,”
representation is “competent,” and so on. In contrast, theories that focus
on access to the civil justice system have not received a great deal of
attention.77
On the assumption that the content of the criminal and civil law is
generally justified, we have further reason to think that the right to
privacy is not absolute and is not as important from the standpoint of
morality than the rights to life, freedom from physical assaults, and
freedom from property crimes that generally function to protect a more
general right to security.
There are several general points to be made here. First, violations of
those rights that protect security generally have both civil and criminal
remedies. For example, certain homicides are not only punishable by the
criminal law, but also actionable under the civil law under such causes of
action, such as wrongful death claims. Physical assaults are both punishable
under criminal law and actionable under the civil laws for compensatory
damages. Crimes against property, likewise, are actionable under both
criminal and civil laws. Although there are some infringements of privacy
interests that are criminalized, such as laws prohibiting persons from
looking into windows or laws prohibiting persons from taking videos
or photographs, without consent, of people using public bathrooms,
74. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
passim (1981).
75. JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST
APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 1–63 (2001).
76. NOZICK, supra note 54, at 164–74.
77. One exception is Kenneth Einar Himma, Towards a Theory of Legitimate
Access: Morally Legitimate Authority and the Right of Citizens to Access the Civil
Justice System, 79 WASH. L. REV. 31 (2004).
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these tend to be exceptional. Most infringements upon privacy interests are
actionable only under civil law, which means that the appropriate remedy is
compensation for damages caused by the infringement—remedies that
lack the stigma of disapproval that is attached to criminal convictions
and punishment. It is characteristic of the criminal law that it prohibits
only the worst violations against individuals precisely because of the
harm and stigma caused by punishment.
Second, many criminal laws protecting physical security provide far
more severe penalties than criminal laws protecting privacy interests.
For example, murder is sometimes punishable by death or life in prison,
whereas criminal laws protecting privacy interests provide penalties
nowhere in the neighborhood of life in prison. Similar things can be
said about physical assaults and many crimes against property, such as
burglary.
Third, the criminal law will frequently allow proportional force in
defense against culpably violent attacks that significantly threaten a
person’s physical security. Indeed, it is permissible under the criminal
law to utilize deadly force when it appears reasonably necessary to save
one’s own life or the life of other persons from a culpable attack.
Physical assaults may also, as a matter of criminal law, be met with a
proportionately forceful defense. As far as I can tell, it is impermissible
under the criminal law to prevent a criminal breach of privacy interests
by resorting to force of any kind; and it would surely result in a charge
of murder for a person to defend against a criminal breach of privacy by
killing the perpetrator.
Finally, the damages available in a civil suit are generally greater for
acts that cause physical harm or death than for acts that merely breach
privacy. When damages for privacy breaches reach levels associated
with damages normally assessed against acts that violate security interests, it
is usually because the consequences of the privacy breach cause significant
damage to financial interests. Large awards are frequently available
for defamation suits because the resulting harm to a person’s reputation
entails a significant reduction in the victim’s capacity to earn a living;
insofar as large damages are available for civil breaches of privacy
interests, it is more likely to reflect concern for the plaintiff’s property
interests, which count as security interests, than concern for the plaintiff’s
interest in privacy. Although this is not necessarily the case, this much
is certainly true: civil damage awards for significant breaches of security
interests are, other things being equal—for example, ability of the
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respective attorneys—likely to be much larger than awards for significant
breaches of privacy interests. If the substantive content of the criminal
and civil law is largely justified, the content of these laws provides yet
another reason for thinking that privacy interests are not absolute and
are, from the standpoint of morality, less important than security interests.
Something very similar can be said about normative theories of
constitutional law that assume that the content of constitutional law is
generally justified and attempt to justify that content by reference to
moral principles showing the content in its best moral light. Whereas
the Constitution expressly affords protection of the rights to life, liberty,
and property, it does not expressly provide protection of privacy interests.
It is true, of course, that some of the protections afforded to security rights
are somewhat indirect—the Due Process Clause seems a peculiarly
modest principle for protecting life and property—but the Constitution
itself says nothing that clearly immediately implies any sort of protection of
privacy. Although the Supreme Court has, correctly in my view, inferred a
right to privacy from the penumbra of more basic protections of liberty
and security from unreasonable searches and seizures, this inference
(1) is far more indirectly protected than the rights protected by the Due
Process Clause and (2) has largely been construed to protect the right to
reproductive privacy—or, perhaps more appropriately, liberty—with respect
to the choice of whom to marry and whether to have children, and not
anything that would count as informational privacy.
While it is clear that some protection of informational privacy should
be guaranteed by the state, whether in the form of statutes, common law,
or constitutional law, the assumption that our Constitution is generally
legitimate suggests yet another reason for thinking that privacy interests
fall well short of being absolute and lack the importance of security
interests. A constitution that failed to protect life and liberty would surely
be a moral nonstarter so to speak—that is, lacking content so important
that it could not plausibly be regarded as generally legitimate—our
Constitution is plausibly regarded as generally legitimate, despite lacking
many protections of information privacy that ideally would be protected
by a constitution that purports to lay down the “supreme law of the
land.” This suggests, again, that privacy interests lack the moral import
of security interests.
XIII. SECURITY AS A PREREQUISITE FOR THE MEANINGFUL
EXERCISE OF PRIVACY RIGHTS
The last argument I wish to make in this essay will be brief because it
is extremely well known and has been made in a variety of academic and
nonacademic contexts. The basic point here is that no right not involving
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security can be meaningfully exercised in the absence of efficacious
protection of security. The right to property means nothing if the law
fails to protect against threats to life and bodily security. Likewise, the
right to privacy has little value if one feels constrained to remain in
one’s home because it is so unsafe to venture away that one significantly
risks death or grievous bodily injury.
This is not merely a matter of describing common subjective preferences;
this is rather an objective fact about privacy and security interests. If
security interests are not adequately protected, citizens will simply not
have much by way of privacy interests to protect. While it is true, of
course, that people have privacy interests in what goes on inside the
confines of their home, they also have legitimate privacy interests in a
variety of public contexts that cannot be meaningfully exercised if one is
afraid to venture out into those contexts because of significant threats to
individual and collective security—such as would be the case if terrorist
attacks became highly probable in those contexts.
It is true, of course, that to say that X is a prerequisite for exercising a
particular right Y does not obviously entail that X is morally more
important than Y, but this is a reasonable conclusion to draw. If it is true
that Y is meaningless in the absence of X, then it seems clear that X
deserves, as a moral matter, more stringent protection than Y does.
Since privacy interests lack significance in the absence of adequate
protection of security interests, it seems reasonable to infer that security
interests deserve, as a moral matter, more stringent protection than privacy
interests.
XIV. CONCLUSION
In this essay, I have argued that the moral interest in or right to privacy
is not absolute and is sometimes outweighed by the moral interest in or
right to security. I have done so from two points of view. First, at the
beginning of the essay, I have sketched intuitions to that effect, which I
assume are widely shared among persons in cultures like ours. Second, I
have argued that all the mainstream approaches to normative theories of
state legitimacy presuppose, assert, or imply that privacy is less important
from the standpoint of political morality than security. Accordingly,
under ordinary intuitions and each of these theories, security interests
trump, or outweigh, privacy interests when the two come into conflict.
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